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This thesis evaluates Canada‘s compliance with human rights-based complementary 
international protection. Through an analysis of the roots of international refugee 
protection, it first links the evolution of the latter with the development of human rights 
law instruments. It then defines complementary protection as the corpus of legal bases for 
asylum claims outside of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. It uses 
various human rights instruments to outline international protection obligations, which 
take three different forms of complementary protection. The first one consists in 
independent protection mechanisms outside of the Refugee Convention, the most 
important being the formulation of non-refoulement in the Convention Against Torture. 
The others are rights that expand the application of existing protection mechanisms, and 
protection mechanisms established by the UNHCR outside of existing international 
treaties. This thesis argues that Canada‘s application of these norms reflects partial 
compliance with its obligations, as it acknowledges important humanitarian concerns 
regarding international protection, while attempting to preserve its prerogative to exclude 
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This thesis is about how the evolution of international protection mechanisms, in light of 
the development of international human rights law, affects the Canadian asylum system. 
The main inquiry of this thesis is the extent to which the adoption of international human 
rights treaties has had an impact on obligations created by the 1951 Convention relating 
to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention)
1
, and how these obligations have been 
implemented in Canadian law. 
This thesis seeks to answer this question by exploring three different phenomena. Firstly, 
it considers how the evolution of international protection has resulted in the creation of 
so-called ―complementary protection‖ mechanisms, which are new and separate sources 
of protection. This thesis also explores how international treaties that are not directly 
focused on international protection, but on international human rights, affect and expand 
the interpretation of existing protection mechanisms. Thirdly, this inquiry is completed 
by a brief exploration of less formal sources of protection that lie in the United Nations 
bodies‘ mandate and activities. 
These three types of developments in international law result in obligations for states that 
are parties to the concerned conventions and member states of the United Nations, of 
which Canada is a part. The protection mechanisms offered by Canada are essentially 
reflected in the recently reformed Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA)
2
, 
which now expands protection beyond the obligations created in the Refugee Convention. 
Hence, my research is directed at determining how and to what extent IRPA‘s expansion 
                                                 
1
 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (entered into force 22 
April 1954, accession by Canada 4 June 1969) [Refugee Convention]. 
2
 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. I-25 [IRPA]. 
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of protection to asylum-seekers reflects compliance with international human rights law 
instruments and the renewed international protection system they create. I include within 
the scope of my analysis of human rights law, the prohibition of torture and the protection 
of civil and political rights, the protection of social, economic and cultural rights, as well 
as human rights specific to children and women. 
Because this thesis juggles with a variety of new and old concepts, the first chapter is 
aimed at setting up the theoretical background and the framework for the analysis of 
complementary protection sources. Complementary international protection can be 
understood as having similar characteristics as refugee protection while being separate 
from it. The formal sources of the international refugee law regime are thus a benchmark 
for the evaluation of complementary protection sources. I introduce my analysis by 
delving briefly into the history of asylum and international protection and finding clues as 
to how it has shaped the formation of the international refugee law regime and more 
specifically the drafting of the Refugee Convention. 
I will begin this historical overview by looking into the first manifestations of protection 
granted to foreign nationals and their significance in the definition of the nature of 
international protection duties. This will reveal that the idea of shelter from persecution 
stems from historic state practice, and that modern asylum mechanisms draw inspiration 
from the norm of granting diplomatic asylum. This analysis will flow into how the UN‘s 
predecessor, the League of Nations, was the first to create an international protection 
regime through binding international treaties. These treaties show awareness of the need 
for an international response to growing numbers of individuals fleeing persecution, 
though they were also punctual responses to specific conflicts or situations of exodus. 
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The first universal protection regime came along with the 1951 Refugee Convention, 
drafted under the auspices of the UN. Using the travaux préparatoires of the Convention 
and the debates between member states they contain, I argue that the Convention 
definition of refugee
3
 represented a compromise between two positions. The first is that 
international protection requires a generous definition that opens up to new and 
unpredicted protection needs as part of a humanitarian objective, and the second position 
affirms that the definition should be precise, but allow for modifications as new 
protection needs arise. This demonstrates a recognition that international protection 
should intervene when states are unable to protect individuals from persecution. My 
analysis then follows the subsequent evolution of international protection through a failed 
attempt at drafting a UN Convention on Territorial Asylum, followed by recognition of 
the effect of the development of human rights instruments on refugees‘ and asylum 
seekers‘ rights. 
Using the insight gained through the historical context of asylum, I will move on to 
propose a definition of protection in a legal sense, based on what protection means within 
the Refugee Convention. This will help to set states‘ duties of protection against the role 
of international protection. These different levels of protection will allow me to pinpoint 
the type of international protection that can be qualified as complementary. I suggest that 
complementary international protection includes all types of protection outside of that 
offered by the state of nationality and the formal well-established international protection 
regime created by the Refugee Convention. I will also justify the qualification of 
alternative protection for forms of domestic implementation of complementary 
                                                 
3
 Article 1(A)2 Refugee Convention. 
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international protection. Since this idea of protection refers to the respect and fulfilment 
of human rights, I will continue Chapter 2 with a discussion of the connection between 
international human rights law and international refugee protection in order to further 
support the use of human rights law for expanding international protection. This 
discussion will be completed by a reflection on the nature of the state‘s duty to protect 




The last section of chapter 2 is dedicated to a brief review of the legal basis for the 
existence of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and its 
mandate, which has grown to be more inclusive and far-reaching than the Refugee 
Convention. I demonstrate that even if it is a weaker source of obligations for member 
states, it has become a standard-setting organization, and its Executive Committee has 
been instrumental in the interpretation of states‘ international protection obligations, 
including complementary international protection. The UNHCR has a mandate flexible 
enough to adopt various assistance initiatives for displaced persons, which are often 
subsequently validated by the UN General Assembly. Although it does not originate in a 
treaty, I argue that the UNHCR benefits from support by much of the international 
community and, as such, may be considered a source of complementary protection. I 
further note that Canada has generally collaborated with the UNHCR by providing 
resettlement to protected persons abroad. 
                                                 
4
 Sandra Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008). 
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In Chapter 3, I will analyze non-refoulement, the principle that garners the most scholarly 
and state support
5
 as a complementary protection mechanism. Non-refoulement refers to 
the right not to be returned to a country where one faces a risk to life or a risk of torture 
or cruel, unusual or inhuman treatment or punishment. This principle was already stated 
in the Refugee Convention, but it emerged as a complementary protection mechanism 
with the Convention Against Torture (CAT)
6
, and is a corollary of the prohibition of 
torture itself. I will therefore open the chapter with a general overview of the roots of the 
prohibition of torture and I will explain its qualification as a jus cogens norm. I will also 
explain the state duties that come along with the right not to be subjected to torture in 
light of Fredman‘s theory of human rights. 
I will then expand on the principle of non-refoulement itself by providing a definition and 
a discussion of its scope. This will allow me to explain its qualification as a mechanism 
of complementary international protection, and to argue that as outlined in the CAT, it 
becomes a mechanism for international protection by obligating states to create 
alternative protection mechanisms on the domestic level. The scope of non-refoulement 
inevitably leads to a debate on its peremptory nature. I will also go into a discussion of 
exceptions to the principle created in the Refugee Convention and in state practice, in an 
attempt to reconcile them with the absolute prohibition of refoulement created by the 
CAT. 
                                                 
5
 Jane McAdam, Complementary Protection in International Refugee Law (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2007); Ruma Mandal, ―Protection Mechanisms Outside of the 1951 Convention (―Complementary 
Protection‖)‖ (June 2005) Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, PPLA/2005/02 (UNHCR, 
Department of International Protection). 
6
 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 




My analysis of the principle of non-refoulement under international law will form the 
framework for an evaluation of Canada‘s implementation of this principle through the 
alternative protection mechanism for ―persons in need of protection‖ in section 97 of 
IRPA. This provision has been swiftly qualified as an expression of non-refoulement and 
an implementation of art. 3 CAT
7
, which prohibits the return to torture, but I propose to 
examine it in further detail and suggest that this affirmation is only partially true. I argue 
that this section both widens the scope of non-refoulement as expressed in the CAT, 
while including exceptions to the principle that are incompatible with international law. 
Following a dissection of the text of the IRPA itself, I will look into how the principle of 
non-refoulement was defined and applied within case law, in order to demonstrate 
Courts‘ tendency to reconcile the imperfections in the legislation with the rules of 
international law, instead of reassessing its validity in light of Canada‘s obligations. 
Chapter 4 will be concerned with rights that are relevant to refugees contained in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
8
 and with how they expand 
the scope of complementary international protection mechanisms. More specifically, I 
will discuss how the formulation of non-refoulement in the ICCPR widens the scope of 
the principle as well as the role of this expansion within complementary protection. My 
argument is that it specifies the nature and scope of the obligation to create an alternative 
protection mechanism to guarantee non-refoulement on the domestic level. I further argue 
that the ICCPR, through its articles relating to alien rights and non-discrimination, creates 
procedural safeguards and guarantees access to state territory for foreign nationals fleeing 
persecution. The overview of regional instruments that follows will show that they make 
                                                 
7
 McAdam, supra note 5 at 129-130; Mandal, supra note 5 ¶ 194-202. 
8
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into 
force 23 March 1976, accession by Canada 19 May 1976) [ICCPR]. 
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the principles embodied in the ICCPR more explicit and specifically applicable to 
persons outside of the Convention definition, and they reaffirm international protection as 
a humanitarian concern. 
The second section of chapter 4 will be dedicated to an analysis of the application of the 
ICCPR within Canadian case law, particularly in relation to the protection of the rights 
contained in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter)
9
 for asylum-seekers 
and refugees. It will also deal with the implementation of ICCPR rights within the IRPA. 
Through this analysis, I will show how the IRPA should be interpreted according to 
instruments such as the ICCPR and according to humanitarian considerations.  
I will also aim to demonstrate that the ICCPR‘s treatment by courts reflects a propensity 
to interpret Canadian law as consistent with international treaties to which Canada is a 
party, regardless of whether they are directly applied in the legislation. Finally, chapter 4 
will look into the effect of the procedural safeguards and territorial access that are 
guaranteed by the ICCPR, and it will demonstrate how the Canadian asylum system 
limits access to the country‘s territory without proper weighing of competing rights in 
accordance with international human rights principles. 
In chapter 5, I apply a similar methodology to an analysis of social, economic and 
cultural rights within the Refugee Convention, and within the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
10
. My research regarding this 
instrument will show that socio-economic and cultural rights are more valued and 
respected by states when it comes to settlement, or once an individual is recognized as a 
                                                 
9
 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the 
Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter]. 
10
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 
(entered into force 3 January 1976, accession by Canada 19 May 1976) [ICESCR]. 
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refugee. In terms of the possibility of claiming protection based on a violation or denial 
of a social, economic or cultural right, my analysis will reveal that states only have the 
obligation to grant protection when the violation amounts to persecution under the 
Refugee Convention, or when it constitutes cruel, inhuman or unusual treatment or 
punishment. 
I will also extend my research on socio-economic rights to situations where the 
development of complementary modes of protection would seem appropriate, such as 
displacement caused by climate change and natural disasters, the inability to obtain 
adequate health care, and the longer-term persecutory effects of discrimination in 
education.  
My argument is that victims of natural disasters are only protected by international treaty 
law in cases where they also suffer persecution due to one of the Convention grounds as a 
result of the instability created by the disaster. Other individuals have to rely on the 
UNHCR and other organizations who provide assistance initiatives. Individuals deprived 
of appropriate health care may only be protected if they are being denied health care as a 
means of persecution for one of the five enumerated reasons in the Refugee Convention. 
As for education, it is only vaguely mentioned in the UNHCR‘s interpretation of 
persecution under the Refugee Convention, from which it is difficult to conclude that a 
state obligation to protect exists. These arguments will allow me to demonstrate that 
Canada has extended the scope of the existing protection mechanisms it offers to persons 
being denied socio-economic rights beyond that required by the Refugee Convention, and 
awards refugee or protected person status to such individuals. 
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Chapter 6 will serve to demonstrate that an individual‘s personal status or belonging to a 
family may influence the application of the refugee protection regime. I will examine 
how the importance of family unity may affect individual claims or deportation orders 
and serve to extend protection to some individuals who would otherwise be denied 
protection. I will show that it has some impact, but it is stronger when tied to the respect 
of the best interests of the child. Claims that would have been rejected may be reversed 
only because the best interests of the child are given considerable weight in international 
law, and within the Canadian refugee protection regime.  
I will end chapter 6 by briefly looking into the impact that gender and sex have on the 
interpretation of the Refugee Convention definition, and how it affects the assessment of 
risk and persecution based on the five enumerated grounds, where female claimants are 
concerned. I will focus at greater length on persecution against members of a particular 
social group, and argue that women in general, as well as subgroups of women, may be 
considered as particular social groups when they are subject to different treatment based 
on sex, but that considerations related to gender are still inconsistently applied. I will use 
the guidelines issued by the UNHCR as the main source for the interpretation of the 
Convention in regard to women‘s rights, and will present a few examples of how they 
have been integrated into Canadian case law. 
Based on this research, this thesis will argue that Canada has only partially complied with 
its international obligations regarding complementary protection in light of international 
human rights law. Despite the integration of the prohibition of torture and non-
refoulement within the IRPA, the Act contains possibilities for exclusion that are 
irreconcilable with Canada‘s international obligations. I would suggest that when it 
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comes to new protection mechanisms that are separate from the Refugee Convention, 
Canada is reluctant to fully commit to the relatively new protection obligations set out by 
the CAT. The Canadian protection system appears more open to a logical and reasonable 
expansion via the interpretation of the Refugee Convention by general human rights 
instruments. I will show that where the obligations are clearly set out by the UNHCR‘s 
interpretations of international human rights law, Canada is willing to comply, but where 
there is debate, uncertainty or contradiction, Canadian legislation tends to opt for the 
minimal obligation. Finally, my analysis of the UNHCR mandate will reveal that Canada, 
nonetheless, upholds the humanitarian tradition of international protection by cooperating 
with the UNHCR‘s initiatives. 
 
 11 
Chapter 2. The Refugee Concept Revisited 
This chapter sets up the theoretical framework of my thesis. In order to gain insight into 
the duties related to international protection, I begin with an overview of the roots of 
asylum. This allows for a better grasp of the evolution of various mechanisms of 
international protection into an international refugee law regime, and for a better 
understanding of how the concept of protection was perceived by states when creating 
protection mechanisms. It also reveals hints that the international protection regime was 
designed in tandem with the creation of an international human rights law regime. I draw 
upon this historical inquiry to establish a working definition of protection through the 
distinctions between state protection, international protection, and complementary 
protection.  
Next, since the connection between refugee law and human rights law is a fundamental 
element of complementary protection, I dedicate a section of this chapter to human rights 
theory and to the state duties attached to the protection of human rights. I conclude this 
chapter with a brief analysis of the UNHCR‘s mandate, the significance of its evolution 
and expansion, and the impact it has on member states. 
2.1.Historical Evolution of Protection 
2.1.1. Early History of Asylum and Refugee Protection 
A brief history of the roots of asylum and refugee protection will reveal how the 
association between asylum and persecution emerged. It might also help in building an 
understanding of the language that surrounds international refugee protection and 
complementary protection. Despite the lack of treaties or agreements specific to refugees 
or asylum seekers before the 20
th
 century, it has been recognized, through the 
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development of international aliens law, that aliens
11
 were a vulnerable group that found 
itself at the mercy of the sovereign state
12
.  
The first agreements between European states with regards to aliens were concerned with 
foreign traders. These were concluded during the sixteenth century to grant protection to 
such traders through the guarantee of safe border-crossing and basic civil rights
13
. It was 
relatively easy for traders and migrants to acquire such rights and benefit from a freedom 
of international movement
14
. It is suggested that at the time, no further generalized 
protection was necessary for migrants, as states harboured hardly any concern for the 




Another source of modern refugee law lies in the protection offered to fugitives against 
unjust punishment for political offences, and how it morphed from a defence from 
extradition to a defence from deportation as states began to protect and close their 
borders
16
. From this, ―[it] followed that, if asylum‘s historical purpose was to be served 
in a world of closed borders, asylum needed to be made available to all those who were 
persecuted and who would otherwise be excluded or deported, and not merely those who 
were actually sought for extradition‖
17
. The purpose of the persecution requirement, in 
turn, was ―to distinguish between refugees deserving of asylum on the one hand, and 
                                                 
11
 New Oxford American Dictionary, 2d ed., s.v. ―alien‖: ―belonging to a foreign country or nation‖. 
12
 James C. Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under international law (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005) at 79 [Hathaway, Rights of Refugees]. 
13
 Ibid. at 76. 
14





Matthew E. Price, Rethinking Asylum: History, Purpose and Limits (New York: Cambridge University 





ordinary migrants excluded by the new immigration restriction on the other hand‖
18
. 
From the outset, this served as a basis for the consideration of asylum as the state offering 
a safe haven, a protection from being sent back to one‘s country of origin. It was not a 
legal status, although it may have been attached to one, as it referred to the general idea 
of protection from deportation. It hence becomes relevant to refer to persons seeking 
protection in the wider sense as asylum-seekers, and to view asylum as protection offered 
by a state including but not limited to refugee protection. 
Historical inquiries generally reveal that the idea of criteria for immigration or refugee 
status determination were modern twentieth century concerns that went hand in hand with 
the emergence of the international human rights law regime and the growing importance 
of state sovereignty
19
. This idea of the nation state was arguably tainted by a mentality of 




The roots of the international refugee law doctrine as we know it appear to stem from 
diplomatic asylum
21
. This type of asylum mainly refers to ambassadors and other people 
escaping the jurisdiction of a country while dwelling on its territory. Nevertheless, its 
history reveals a number of situations where embassies granted asylum to people who 
had committed political crimes. In a number of these cases, such as that of a Danish 
dignitary granting refuge to Spanish people sought for political reasons in 1843
22
, 
diplomatic asylum was not used merely by states to provide an extraterritorial refuge for 






 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, International Law and the Movement of Persons Between States (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1978) at 91. 
21
 UN General Assembly, Question of Diplomatic Asylum: Report of the Secretary-General, UN GAOR, 
30th Sess., UN Doc. A/10139 (Part II) (1975). 
22
 Ibid. ¶ 10. 
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their own citizens. Although it may have started out this way during the sixteenth 
century
23
, it was increasingly used as protection for political activists during periods of 
political instability. 
The rules for diplomatic asylum reflected similar concerns to those of modern asylum 
mechanisms, through their rejection of perpetrators of crime and inclusion of individuals 
who were persecuted for political reasons
24
. This suggests that as nations ventured into 
the development of a doctrine of protection, they may have drawn some inspiration from 
the evolution of the doctrine of diplomatic asylum as a means for a state to grant 
protection to persons who seek it within its jurisdiction, a situation equivalent to the 
granting of refugee status or complementary protection today. It also demonstrates early 
signs of awareness that a person may find himself to be the victim of persecution by his 
own state or unable to benefit from state protection. In other words, there was recognition 
that a person could legitimately seek refuge in another nation‘s territory if her basic 
freedoms were threatened in her country of nationality or residence. 
2.1.2. Refugee Protection under the League of Nations 
As the first international organization with a universal and far reaching mandate, the 
League of Nations established the first international treaties granting refugee protection.  
In the early agreements of the League of Nations during the 1920s, this protection was 
translated into punctual measures and arrangements regarding specific groups of people 
who no longer benefited from any state protection
25
. These agreements targeted particular 
                                                 
23
 Ibid. ¶ 2. 
24
 Ibid. ¶ 13; Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law, 2d ed. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996) at 117-118 [Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee]. 
25
 Arrangement With Regard to the Issue of Certificates to Russian Refugees, 5 July 1922, 13 L.N.T.S. No. 
355; Arrangement Relating to the Issue of Identity Certificates to Russian and Armenian Refugees, 12 May 
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groups of people who were victims of political occurrences of the time and whose status 
became unclear as a result of political turmoil and war
26
. They defined refugees 
according to specific ethnic or national origin and lack of protection from the state
27
. The 




Refugee status determination within the framework of the League of Nations was, 
therefore, not a measure generally applicable to individual migrants fleeing their country, 
but only to specific situations of mass exodus. At the time, refugee status was a quite 
uncommon response to new and anomalous situations
29
. In the case of the Germans in the 
1930s, a new agreement was created for their inclusion in the international refugee 
protection regime
30
, but this time, recognizing their need for protection as political 
dissidents
31
. This further suggests that the League of Nations regime was merely a series 
of responses to punctual protection needs. One could say that a similar logic directs the 
creation of complementary modes of protection today, as they are responses to new 
situations unaccounted for by current protection regimes. 
                                                                                                                                                 
1926, 89 L.N.T.S. No. 2004; Arrangement Relating to the Legal Status of Russian and Armenian Refugees, 
30 June 1928, 89 L.N.T.S. No. 2005. 
26
 Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee, supra note 24 at 4; Hathaway, Refugee Status, supra note 14 at 4; Agnès 
Hurwitz, The Collective Responsibility of States to Protect Refugees (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2009) at 10-11; Gunnel Stenberg, Non-Expulsion and Non-Refoulement: the prohibition against removal of 
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Nonetheless, a few stateless people straying into a sovereign country would have been of 
little interest to the burgeoning international community. The treaties were deemed 
necessary because of the massive displacement of persons, which put the member states 
at risk of social disorder and possible loss of control over immigration
32
. Also, the 
political views of displaced persons were not relevant in the determination of their status 
until the 1930s, nor was any individual characteristic other than ethnic origin
33
. As the 
original belief was that the need for refugee protection would subside, no general 
instrument was implemented.  
Before the 1930s, the protection system devised by the League of Nations remained 
essentially based on groups from specific ethnic origins chosen in an arbitrary way that 
was coloured by the politics of the countries of refuge
34
. This resulted in the existence of 
large groups of people who had lost their nationality, but who did not fall under any of 
the agreements granting refugee status
35
. These smaller groups finding themselves in a 
similar situation to that of Armenian and Russian refugees include Turks in Greece, Jews 
in Romania, and Hungarians dispersed through Austria, France and Romania
36
. 
The evolution of the world economy during the 1930s, combined with the realization that 
refugees would not, or, at least, not immediately, return to their country of origin, led to 
the adoption of the 1938 Convention relating to the International Status of Refugees 
which granted refugees socio-economic rights in terms of labour, welfare and education 
in the country of refuge
37
. This treaty is seen to be one of the earliest manifestations of a 
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legally binding human rights protection regime
38
, and it foreshadows the continuing 
interconnectivity between international human rights law and the law of refugee status.  
Further, it allowed states to extend protection to groups other than those expressly 
mentioned in the previous agreements, thus creating an extended protection mechanism. 
Some may argue that it was an early form of complementary protection
39
, but it appears 
more clearly to be the first sign of the elimination of categorization based on ethnic 
origin, which would eventually lead to a wider international refugee definition. 
On the other hand, just as states were free to extend protection to displaced persons 
beyond their obligations, there were examples where they would instead practice the 
forced return (refoulement) of refugees for various reasons. For instance, Poland had 
issued a number of decrees to remove Russian refugees within its territory who had not 
fled for political reasons
40
. The agreements developed in the later part of the inter-war 
period stated a prohibition on refoulement of refugees who had legally entered the 
country, to which the only exception was security or public order
41
.  
Although historically important and most likely a source of inspiration to the later 
development of refugee law, these instruments were not acceded to by a majority of 
European states, and expulsion and forcible return for arbitrary reasons remained 
engrained in common practice
42
. At the time, non-refoulement, the right not to be 
returned to a country where one faces a risk to life, was a principle developed to protect 
from subsequent deportation persons already accepted as refugees. My discussion of this 
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principle in Chapter 3 will explore how it parted from refugee protection to create an 
alternate mode of protection. 
2.1.3. The Drafting of the 1951 Refugee Convention 
In this subsection, I provide insight into what protection meant in the original drafting of 
the Refugee Convention, as well as its intended interaction with human rights protection 
instruments. My analysis deals with the inclusion of non-refoulement in the text of the 
Refugee Convention, as this is particularly important to my discussion of the concept in 
Chapter 3. This section will allow a better understanding of the benchmark protection 
from which additional or complementary protection is derived. 
The drafting of the Refugee Convention can be deemed to have been initiated in the fall 
of 1949, with a draft resolution calling for the constitution of a High Commissioner‘s 
Office for Refugees, and for the drafting of a convention for the protection of refugees
43
. 
The resolution also calls for the provisional adoption of the definition contained in the 
constitution of the International Refugee Organization (IRO)
44
, which had been 
established in 1949 as a temporary specialized agency of the UN
45
.  
Prior to this draft resolution, the UN Secretary General had issued a noteworthy report 
dealing with the definition of refugee, and with the extent of international refugee 
protection functions, which included the text of the IRO definition
46
. This report also 
dealt with the role and nature of international protection, an element of great interest with 
regards to the subject matter of the present thesis. Indeed, the Secretary General writes 
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that the first agent of protection to refugees and displaced persons is the state itself, and 
international protection is complementary to the state‘s protection
47
. In that sense, 
complementary protection could actually refer to all forms of protection provided by 
international law. 
The definition in the IRO constitution identifies two types of persons in need of 
protection. These are ―refugees‖ and ―displaced persons‖, both of which acquire the 
relevant status as a result of the Second World War. The absence of state protection is 
only mentioned in the case of refugees, whereas displaced persons have a temporary 
status brought about by deportation by an occupying state, and from which they benefit 
until they are repatriated
48
. The definition of refugee also includes anyone who was 
considered a refugee prior to the adoption of the IRO constitution
49
. This tends to 
accentuate the idea that international protection is fundamentally a complement to state 
protection, and to suggest that member states intended to build on the existing definitions 
when drafting the Refugee Convention. 
In 1946, a United Nations General Assembly Resolution reaffirmed that no refugees or 
displaced persons could be compelled to return to their country of origin
50
. This form of 
non-refoulement, as an element of the protection afforded to persons who benefit from a 
legally defined refugee status, was the only one officially recognized by the United 
Nations, just as it was under the auspices of the League of Nations
51
. 
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Early on in the discussion regarding international protection of asylum seekers, it was 
recognized that the issue was primarily a humanitarian concern
52
, and not a temporary 
one, as it was deemed unreasonable and inhuman to repatriate certain groups of refugees 
defined merely by ethnicity, such as Jews and Armenians
53
. It was also proposed by 
France that refugee protection should include the granting of a status, as well as material 
assistance, and so would include ―legal, social, religious and political protection‖
54
. In 
subsequent meetings, France pursued this idea further, proposing that although it may 
have been appropriate for the IRO to define only specific situations where protection was 
afforded, the United Nations had to avoid such discrimination and provide a wide 
framework of protection
55
. This is consistent with the report of the Secretary General, 
which defined international refugee protection as complementary to state protection, 
suggesting that it should apply to all situations where state protection is unavailable. 
On the other hand, the United States argued that the existing categories of refugees 
should be maintained and new ones created by the General Assembly as the need would 
arise
56
. Their perception of international protection followed a protection framework 
according to which complementary protection regimes are additions to a continuously 
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growing list of persons protected by the international community. Their proposition was 
to continue a collection of specific protection regimes whenever state protection needed 
to be corrected or complemented.  
The distinction with the French position lay in the fact that the United States did not want 
to take responsibility in advance for asylum needs that did not yet exist
57
. Their approach 
would thus lead to a need for successive additions of complementary regimes, whereas 
the French position would lead to a unified international protection framework that would 
encompass all needs through a wide definition. Indeed: 
France, true to its tradition, would like the definition of the term "refugees" to be as 
generous as possible; since, before the proposed convention entered into force, new 
and undreamed-of categories of refugees might be created, the definition should be 
couched in general terms, if necessary with specific exceptions, but should not 
enumerate the categories to be protected. In view of the turbulent state of the world, 
no such list could ever be complete.
58
 
In a way, the French position also recognized that not only groups of people might need 
protection, but that individuals may also find themselves in need of asylum. 
The final result appears to be a compromise between the two positions, as the scope of 
protection is relatively wide, but geographically and temporally limited to persons who 
are displaced as a result of events that occurred in Europe before 1951
59
. It also includes 
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 Article 1(A)(2) Refugee Convention: ―For the purposes of the present Convention, the term ―refugee‖ 
shall apply to any person who: […] As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to 
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and 
being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to 
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the refugees as they were previously defined in the League of Nations agreements and 
conventions
60
. After the adoption of the Refugee Convention, the occurrence of a series 
of refugee movements in Europe and northern Africa that did not satisfy the original time 
limit
61
 resulted in a gap between the scope of the Refugee Convention and refugee 
protection needs in UN member states. The 1967 Protocol
62
 closed this protection gap 
created by the temporal and geographical limitations in the Refugee Convention, thus 




Another point of interest in a discussion of complementary protection is article 33(1) of 
the Refugee Convention, the first widely accepted formulation of the concept of non-
refoulement
64
. Based on the travaux préparatoires, the protection it offers is deemed to 
apply beyond individuals recognized as refugees to non-admittance at the frontier, as well 
as extradition. This is indicated by the words ―in any manner whatsoever‖
65
, and the 
simple fact that the same reasons for persecution were repeated in a different article. 
Otherwise, the two would have been unnecessarily repetitive where a reference to the 
article 1 definition would have sufficed. On the other hand, Goodwin-Gill‘s analysis of 
the drafting of the Convention has revealed that the members present had a clear intention 
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of not letting refugees be returned to any country where they face a risk, but it does not 




McAdam further stresses that the drafters were most likely aware that this article could 
expand protection to persons who did not fall under the definition of refugee given in 
article 1, because article 33 embodies article 14 of the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights (UDHR), which states the right to enjoy asylum
67
, thus indicating a desire to see 
the Refugee Convention evolve along with human rights principles
68
. The same 
principles may eventually impact on the interpretation of the concept of persecution, as 
well as create independent mechanisms that prevent removal
69
. This view also suggests 
that there was openness to the evolution of international protection, one that would be 
guided by international human rights law. Chapter 3 will discuss in greater detail the 
significance of non-refoulement in the expansion of international protection. 
2.1.4. Evolution in the Application of the Convention Definition 
Protection gaps are easy to find, as it is always possible to be more generous. The only 
international legislative measure of expansion adopted after the Refugee Convention was 
the removal of temporal and geographical limitations by the 1967 Protocol, but it remains 
important to look into the expansion of the refugee concept, be it through a more 
generous interpretation of the Refugee Convention, or by domestic legislation. 
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After the adoption of the 1967 Protocol, it appears that states realized the need to go 
further in providing for international protection needs that did not exist within the 
Refugee Convention definition. To demonstrate that point, Hathaway argues that the 
records of the aborted 1977 Draft Convention on Territorial Asylum meant to embody the 
right to seek and enjoy asylum in the UDHR and the Declaration on Territorial Asylum
70
.  
Consistent with the fact that article 14 of the UDHR provides individuals with asylum 
from persecution without restrictions, and that the Draft Declaration on Territorial 
Asylum further proclaims that right and includes persons struggling against colonialism, 
this proposed convention would have broadened the concepts of persecution and political 
opinion
71
. In this new agreement, political opinion was to include opposition to 
colonialism and apartheid, persecution would be expanded to prosecution with 
persecutory intent, as well as persecution based on kinship, foreign occupation, alien 
domination, and all forms of racism
72
. 
Although this draft convention was not adopted, it remains a sign that the international 
community was becoming conscious that asylum needs could manifest themselves 
differently in the post-World War II world. It was recognition, over 25 years on, of the 
existence of situations of persecution outside of the five defined nexus of the Refugee 
Convention, where international protection was required by broader human rights 
principles. The drafting of this new convention resulted in a deadlock
73
, which might 
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explain in part the current existence of several regional agreements and domestic 
legislative measures that extend protection in their own way. Also, this difficulty in 
achieving a more generous international consensus may justify the use of broader human 
rights instruments to expand international protection instead of adopting a new treaty. 
Even though the original Refugee Convention was drafted with the aim of going beyond 
a minimal common denominator to please the restrictions of all participating states, it was 
done with an appreciation of the sacrifices that should be made to reach a consensus
74
, 
and that protection gaps would hence be created. Consequently, it would make sense to 
argue that even the Convention itself can protect refugees beyond the scope of article 
1(A)(2), and that nothing in it prevents the application of the status it creates to other 
situations where protection is needed
75
. 
In addition to the attempt at drafting a new convention, the development of regional 
instruments, as well as informal categories of protection in state practice, have been 
observed
76
. Hathaway pointed out, however, that expanded protection for persons who 
face forced migration had not evolved into international customary law as of 1991
77
. He 
only identifies a customary right to be considered for temporary admission upon crossing 
the border, on the basis of a need for protection
78
. In other words, asylum seekers have a 
right to be heard when they come from a troubled country, which is merely a procedural 
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right. His analysis might be different twenty years on, in customary law as well as in light 
of new international legal instruments. This is especially probable given that the 
Convention Against Torture, which includes another version of non-refoulement, had not 
entered into force at the time. I will pursue this analysis further in chapter 3. 
It has nonetheless been argued that complementary protection on the international level, 
that is protection complementary to that already offered by the Refugee Convention 
regime, only became part of international debates during the 1980s
79
. This could indicate 
that, facing the impossibility of reaching a consensus on the adoption of a new 
international refugee law instrument, the international community has turned to existing 
instruments to derive protection obligations. This tendency has been mainly developed by 
the UNHCR early on in the 1990s, and has been instrumental in the expansion of this 
institution‘s mandate to persons of concern that do not necessarily fit into the original 
Refugee Convention definition
80
. This mandate will be discussed at greater length in the 
last section of this chapter. 
One point we may take away from the aborted Convention on Territorial Asylum is that, 
just as this Convention was meant to expand the protective measures in the Refugee 
Convention, asylum was considered by states that supported the Convention on 
Territorial Asylum as a wider net of protection than refugee protection
81
. Thus, it would 
be appropriate to refer to persons seeking refugee status or alternative protection 
generally as asylum seekers or protection seekers. The term ―refugee‖ is a defined legal 
concept on both domestic and international levels, as well as a legal status. An asylum 
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seeker or a protection seeker includes refugees, as well as other persons who enter a new 
country in search of protection and a legal status. 
2.2.Defining Protection in a Legal Sense 
2.2.1. Protection as a Legal Concept 
As already explained, the aim of this thesis is to analyze international human rights 
instruments and evaluate whether they create protection obligations for Canada as a 
country of asylum. In order to make sense of these obligations, it is important to explore 
the meaning of protection in the legal context, and the place of complementary protection 
in the international legal framework. In this section, I start by outlining a general 
definition of protection as a legal concept, followed by explanations of the more specific 
concepts of state protection and international protection. I then use all these concepts to 
specify a definition of complementary protection. 
In its simplest form, the concept of ―protection‖ is complementary to that of ―refugee‖, in 
the sense that the concept of ―refugee‖ is defined in terms of ―protection‖, and cannot be 
understood without it. Nevertheless, although the concept of refugee is the subject of a 
legal definition, that of protection remains undefined within international legal 
instruments
82
. Its dictionary definition includes ―a legal or other formal measure intended 
to preserve civil liberties and rights‖
83
. This definition may be relevant in light of article 
31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
84
, which states that ―[a] treaty 
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to 
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose‖. The 
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dictionary definition of protection already suggests, through the terms ―legal or other 
formal measure‖, that protection takes the form of governmental or state action.  
In addition, this ordinary definition is confirmed by the object and purpose of the 
Refugee Convention which, as stated in its preamble, ―[assures] refugees the widest 
possible exercise of […] fundamental rights and freedoms‖
85
. From this, it is fair to 
conclude that the use of the concept of protection in this particular convention carries the 
same meaning.  
A more thorough definition of protection was proposed early on by Grahl-Madsen: 
The word ‗protection‘ denotes measures of some kind or other taken by a subject of 
international law in order to safeguard or promote the integrity, rights or interests of 
an individual. Protection may take many shapes. We may distinguish between 
internal protection (‗the protection of the law‘) and external protection (diplomatic or 
consular protection…). Moreover, protection may be active or passive. Thus, if a 
government intercedes with another government for one of its citizens, we may speak 
of active or explicit protection. On the other hand, if the authorities of one State 
merely enable a person to refer to them and thereby get certain benefits from the 
authorities of another State, we may call it passive or implicit protection. Typical of 




This definition is exhaustive and clearly distinguishes between state protection and 
international protection, and also suggests that the Refugee Convention uses means to 
instate active protection mechanisms. 
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As for the context, the historical analysis in the previous section has demonstrated that 
protection has come to refer to the guaranteeing of a number of rights by states. The exact 
nature of the rights included in this concept and the extent to which they are protected is 
one of the central questions addressed in this thesis.  
In his work, Fortin explores the meaning of protection within the refugee definition. This 
is useful to my argument, to the extent that the use of the concept in the Refugee 
Convention, being the main basis for protection under international law, has rendered it 
the most reliable indication of the meaning of this concept in international law in general. 
The work leading up to the conclusion of the Refugee Convention may also be a 
testimonial to the perception of protection held by states at the time, as well as their 
expectations in terms of its evolution.  
As exposed in my analysis of the League of Nations refugee protection instruments, 
protection was afforded based on specific need, and the main criterion was the lack of 
state protection. This view is supported by Fortin
87
, but he introduces the idea that the 
implied meaning of the concept of protection in the Refugee Convention definition was 
originally that of diplomatic protection
88
. This suggests that protection in the legal 
context may be understood as state protection, which leads me to a more specific 
discussion on this type of protection. 
2.2.2. State Protection 
Within the realm of state protection, Fortin argues that it can be either external or 
internal, and he describes the latter type of state protection as follows:  
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[It may be] promotional, preventive or remedial in nature, and implies the existence 
and effective functioning of administrative and judicial structures, as well as the 
existence and effective functioning of mechanisms and procedures for the 
investigation, prosecution and punishment of violations of the person‘s rights.
89
 
 Such a definition is highly reminiscent of a larger international scheme of protection of 
civil and political rights, and Fortin observes that various human rights instruments 
guarantee such equal protection by the law
90
. 
I have already mentioned McAdam‘s view that the Refugee Convention may well have 
been considered an international legislative vehicle for the non-binding UDHR, as well as 
the then embryonic covenants on human rights
91
. It is thus possible that, in keeping with 
this awareness of human rights, the concept of protection used in the Refugee Convention 
definition encompasses the state‘s protection of the universal human rights of its citizens. 
However, Fortin argues that it refers merely to diplomatic protection, defined as 
consisting ―primarily in the defence by the State of the interests and rights of its nationals 
abroad, when such interests and rights are not respected‖
92
. His position is supported by 
two main arguments, the first of which is the definition of refugee by the Institute of 
International Law, which, as he suggests, inspired the Refugee Convention definition
93
. 
The original definition stated: 
In the present resolutions, the term ―refugee‖ refers to any individual who, due to 
political events on the territory of their State of nationality, has voluntarily or 
involuntarily left the territory of said State, or is unable to return to it, and has 
acquired no other nationality and does not benefit from the diplomatic protection of a 
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State [translated by author]. 
94
 
Fortin argues that despite the omission of the qualification of protection as diplomatic, 
the definition of the Refugee Convention is essentially meant to be the same as the 
foregoing. However, there must be a reason why the term ―diplomatic‖ was dropped from 
the Refugee Convention definition, and it would seem safe to say that the intention might 
have been to allow for the evolution of the concept of ―protection‖ from a term of art 
meaning diplomatic protection
95
, to a larger concept including persons who do not 
possess a nationality. Hathaway and Foster also refute the historical evidence brought 
forth by Fortin, arguing that it is taken out of context, and is too scarce to lead to the 
conclusion that the drafters of the Convention had diplomatic protection in mind when 
they used the word ―protection‖
96
. 
Secondly, Fortin attempts to make the point that the requirement for the claimant to be 
outside her country of habitual residence means that the definition can only refer to 
diplomatic protection
97
, but in many cases a claimant has fled her country due to lack of 
internal protection from persecution. It may be ―evident that the only protection that can 
be made available to persons who are outside their country of nationality, or to which 
such persons can resort, is diplomatic protection‖
98
, but such an interpretation does not 
take into account the reasons which have driven this person outside of their country. 
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To further demonstrate his point that ―protection‖ is actually equivalent to diplomatic 
protection, Fortin argues that refugee status results from a failure by the state to interfere 
when rights are violated, and adversely, cannot be considered as a positive duty to 
protect
99
. He calls attention to situations where the state itself persecutes a person, 
maintaining that it would be absurd to say that such persecution results from the refusal 
of the state to protect its people against itself
100
. As euphemistic or pleonastic as it might 
seem to qualify these cases as results of the inability of the state to protect, they are still 
situations where the state fails to protect, and the fact that the supposed protector 
becomes the persecutor only makes the fear of persecution more well-founded and gives 
better reason to leave one‘s country. This incongruity does not mean, a contrario, that 
there is no positive duty of internal protection from the state when the agent of 
persecution is non-governmental. I will attempt to further outline the nature of a state‘s 
duty to protect in the following section. 
Fortin‘s position, though it fosters an important reflection on the meaning of protection, 
is not shared by most scholars. The reflection and criticism to which his opinion has led 
me reflects the majority position taken by legal scholars. McAdam‘s work is based on the 
premise that the need for international protection arises when a state fails to protect the 
basic human rights of its citizens, and it is a view that was expressed by Goodwin-Gill in 
his introduction to the International Journal of Refugee Law
101
. Another opposing view 
to Fortin‘s position stems from Hathaway‘s work on defining the requirement that there 
be no internal flight alternative (IFA) available for protection to be granted
102
. The idea 
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that a person cannot be considered a refugee if they can safely benefit from the protection 
of their state of nationality in another region of their country, implies that lack of internal 




In a further discussion on the concept of IFA, Hathaway and Foster point out the main 
flaws of Fortin‘s analysis of the Refugee Definition in these terms:  
Taking account of both the ordinary meaning of the notion of ‗protection‖ and the 
ways in which the term ‗protection‘ is used elsewhere in the 1951 Convention, the 
Fortin position is anomalous. In particular, the Preamble refers to the intention of the 
parties to ‗revise and consolidate previous international agreements relating to the 
status of refugees and to extend the scope of protection offered by such instruments‘, 
and to the importance of coordinated measures to facilitate UNHCR‘s task of 
‗supervising international conventions providing for the protection of refugees‘. 
Clearly, ‗protection‘ as referred to in the preamble cannot mean only ‗diplomatic 
protection‘, since the Convention is concerned nearly exclusively with the provision 
of ‗protection‘ understood in the sense of human rights protection.
104
 
They also demonstrate that Fortin‘s position is inconsistent with both the jurisprudence 
that recognizes refugee law as substitute protection and the UNHCR‘s interpretations of 
―protection‖ in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the word
105
. 
Fortin may be right to point out that the contemporary view of protection has stemmed 
from diplomatic protection, just as my historical inquiry has shown that diplomatic 
asylum was the first source of international agreements regarding persons fleeing their 
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country. However, the definition in the Refugee Convention is clearly not limited to 
diplomatic protection, and includes situations where internal protection is lacking. I 
would rather side with Goodwin-Gill‘s assessment of the refugee definition as a ―critical 
point of departure in determining who is entitled to the protection and assistance of the 
United Nations, for it is the lack of protection by their own government which 
distinguishes refugees from ordinary aliens‖
106
. This absence of protection may occur ―as 
a matter of law, for example, in the case of stateless persons; or as a matter of fact, where 
individuals or groups are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of the 
government of their country‖
107
.  
In either case, lack of protection by the state both on the internal and external levels is the 
trigger for international protection. Fortin even admits this in his discussion of stateless 
persons, as he acknowledges that stateless persons cannot benefit from diplomatic 
protection because having a nationality is a requirement for such protection
108
. No state 
has failed to protect them, since no state has ever had the responsibility to do so. Fortin is 
right in his affirmation that stateless persons clearly deserve international protection as 
compensation for their predicament
109
, but it would be wrong to suggest that it is because 
they lack diplomatic protection, for they lack internal state protection as well. Refugees, 
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2.2.3. International Protection 
This discussion on stateless persons flows naturally into the nature and the role of the 
international protection of refugees, stateless persons, and other displaced persons who 
need it, in relation to state protection. This idea that the state is the provider of protection, 
and that, conversely, de jure or de facto statelessness calls for the intervention of 
international protection, suggests that international protection is indeed complementary to 
state protection. Refugee status is defined by a positive criterion, that is the existence of 
an apprehension of persecution, but that fear must be accompanied by a lack of 
protection. This makes international protection appear to be a second recourse, or an 
alternative to state protection. 
Fortin argues that ―[stateless] persons are no longer deprived of all protection in the 
international sphere, as they are entitled to the protection accorded to every human being 
under international law‖
 111
. Thus, his position is that international law takes 
responsibility for individuals who are unprotected by states
112
. Refugees, meanwhile, are 
individuals who have a nationality, but do not benefit from the protection of their country 
of nationality
113
. This lack of protection makes them de jure stateless. Aside from the fact 
that it has to be related to other criteria, statelessness or lack of protection remains the 
basis for the legitimacy of international protection
114
.  
This reasoning is consistent with the previously cited report of the UN Secretary-General, 
which unequivocally defines international refugee protection as complementary to state 
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. This perception has been further confirmed by a former UN High 
Commissioner for refugees, who interpreted the function of international protection as 
being supplemental to the protection offered by the refugee‘s country of residence
116
. 
2.2.4. The Complementary Nature of Protection 
The previous explanations on different levels of protection will allow for a better 
understanding of the concept of complementary protection. This section first defines what 
the term ―complementary‖ means, how it is distinguishable from alternative protection, 
and how it applies to protection in a legal context.  
According to the dictionary, ―complementary‖ refers to ―completing‖ or ―forming a 
complement‖
117
. Such a definition suggests that when something is complementary, it 
forms a complete and absolute entity or a coherent whole when added to what it is 
complementary to, much like two complementary angles form a right angle. In that sense, 
complementary protection would have to create a complete body of protection, one that 
leaves no protection gaps. In light of my historical overview of the emergence of 
international refugee protection, the latter was likely meant to be complementary to state 
protection in such a way.  
Given that complementary protection may refer to international law as being 
complementary to domestic law in terms of protecting individual‘s civil rights and 
liberties, the Refugee Convention itself could be an instrument of complementary 
protection. On the other hand, it could be said that the complementary nature of 
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protection lies within the source of protection, as opposed to the form of protection or the 
status to which it leads
118
. Protection, it seems, would thus be complementary in relation 
to a ―formal‖ source of protection
119
. Currently, the Refugee Convention is the only 
formal source of international protection, but other sources may achieve this formal status 
with time. 
Given the evolution in refugee status and protection seeking situations, and the new 
protection mechanisms that have emerged from that, the Refugee Convention has evolved 
into a solidified, formal protection regime, and that complementary protection comes 
from alternative sources separate from it. I also choose to use the term ―complementary‖ 
for international protection, instead of ―alternative‖ protection. An alternative is 
something ―that is available as another possibility‖
120
. It would be consistent with the 
original function of the international refugee protection regime as a complement to state 
protection to speak of complementary international protection, rather than alternative 
protection. Although complementary international protection comes from a range of 
sources, it tends toward the ideal of a complete protection regime, hence the pertinence of 
the term ―complementary‖. 
Domestic legislation, on the other hand, relies on a government‘s individual policy and 
does not necessarily hold such ambitions of complete protection. On the contrary, when 
an asylum-seeker enters Canada, he or she can choose to present a claim under section 96 
IRPA
121
 for refugee status, or under section 97 IRPA
122
, to be recognized as a person in 
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 Section 96 IRPA: ―A Convention refugee is a person who, by reason of a well-founded fear of 




need of protection. More often than not, he or she would file a claim under both sections, 
and if refused under section 96 IRPA, will hope to be accepted under section 97 IRPA. 
Section 97 IRPA thus fits better under the definition of alternative protection. Generally, 
the domestic implementation of international legislation is embodied in different 
legislative measures that offer alternative bases for protection claims. Hence, it seems 
more appropriate to speak of alternative protection when discussing the implementation 
of complementary international protection on a domestic level. 
2.3.Human Rights Theory 
3.1.1. The Relationship between Human Rights Protection and Refugee 
Protection 
When discussing the meaning of protection within international refugee law, I have made 
several allusions to the idea that the objects of protection are the interests and physical 
integrity of the person, embodied through their civil and political rights. My overview of 
the drafting of the Refugee Convention also revealed its ties to international human rights 
treaties. This begs the question as to the nature of the relationship between the protection 
of human rights and refugee protection in international law.  
                                                                                                                                                 
(a) is outside each of their countries of nationality and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to avail 
themself of the protection of each of those countries; or 
(b) not having a country of nationality, is outside the country of their former habitual residence and is 
unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to return to that country.‖ 
122
 Section 97 IRPA: ―(1) A person in need of protection is a person in Canada whose removal to their 
country or countries of nationality or, if they do not have a country of nationality, their country of former 
habitual residence, would subject them personally 
(a) to a danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of torture within the meaning of Article 1 of the 
Convention Against Torture; or 
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Fortin claims that the fundamental difference between the two regimes is that they 
employ two different standards of proof, such that ―[where] human rights require 
certitude, refugee instruments only require likelihood‖
123
. He points out that international 
human rights sanctioning mechanisms require a violation, whereas refugee protection is a 
more preventive regime
124
. This difference in thresholds could constitute an argument 
against describing protection in international human rights instruments as complementary 
protection. 
However, his characterization overlooks the fact that some human rights require only 
likelihood as well.  This is true of provisions such as article 3 of CAT
125
, which 
recognizes the right not to be returned to a country where one faces a risk of torture. It 
involves likelihood or, more specifically, ―substantial grounds‖ for belief that the right 
could be breached. This example introduces the possibility that provisions resembling 
what Fortin perceives to be refugee protection, that is protection based on likelihood, are 
introduced into what can be generally deemed to be a human rights protection treaty. 
Throughout my analysis of the complementary protection obligations set out by 
international human rights law instruments, this distinction between likelihood and actual 
violations will be useful to identify complementary protection mechanisms. Indeed, 
where the criterion for intervention is the likelihood of a violation, it can be argued that 
we are faced with a complementary protection provision. This might be true of individual 
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articles, such as in the CAT, but I will also attempt to find out if such a criterion of 
likelihood may also be deduced from the object and purpose of the human rights treaties I 
will examine. 
In Hathaway‘s view, there is no distinction in terms of the standard of proof, but he 
recognizes the existence of ―refugee-specific‖ rights within human rights instruments, 
which is consistent with the idea that the Refugee Convention was expanded by the 
incorporation of such rights within international human rights instruments
126
. He argues 
that ―while there has been only modest evolution of the refugee rights regime since 1951, 
the broader field of international human rights law has undergone exponential change‖
127
. 
He also considers the Refugee Convention as ―only the second major human rights 
convention adopted by the United Nations‖
128
.  
Despite the limited evolution of the refugee protection regime, he considers that ―the 
maturation of human rights law over the past half-century has to a certain extent filled the 
vacuum of protection that required the development of a refugee-specific rights regime in 
1951‖
129
. According to this reasoning, refugee law is a component of international human 
rights law. As such, it was formed by the Refugee Convention and expanded by the 
growing number of human rights conventions. Following this view, complementary 
international protection forms an integral part of international human rights law, and any 
human rights treaty may contain so-called ―refugee-specific‖ rights. I agree with this 
view, but since the term ―refugee-specific‖ is not clearly defined, I choose to use the 
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 Ibid. at 120. 
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element of likelihood as identified by Fortin, in order to identify such specific rights 
within human rights instruments. 
Although scholars working in the field of international refugee law consider the 
connection with international human rights law, such interest does not seem to be 
reciprocated by scholars in the field of international human rights. Works that serve as a 
reference in the latter field make no mention of refugee-specific rights or even the 
Refugee Convention as an instrument of human rights protection
130
. This might be due 
merely to a lack of popularity of the topic among scholars in the field, but it does call for 
a careful justification to any claim that a human rights instrument contains provisions that 
provide complementary protection for asylum seekers. 
2.3.2. The State’s Duty to Protect 
Working with the previously stated assumption that refugee protection and 
complementary protection are part of human rights law or, at the very least, connected to 
it, it becomes relevant to look into the role of the state in the application of a person‘s 
right to seek such protection. The issue at hand becomes the nature of the obligation of a 
state that has ratified a human rights treaty. 
The first problem faced within a human rights context is the generality of rights. They 
make sense and are easily accepted when stated in a far-reaching manner, but their 
application to specific problems is difficult
131
. This is even more problematic in the 
context of protection-seekers, as their status is derived from the lack of protection of 
these general rights. The challenge thus becomes the identification of the rights that 
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should be protected, as well as the extent to which they should be protected, which in turn 
allows the definition of the lack or failure of protection. 
The discussion of the extent to which rights should be guaranteed so that a state can be 
deemed to protect a person in a satisfactory manner poses the question of the nature of 
the duties correlative to rights. In the context of refugee law, this becomes a discussion of 
the duties of the state rather than the individual, as it is based on the failure of one state to 
fulfil its duties and the search for another state that can. 
Fredman derives a traditional view of rights as divided between the justiciable civil and 
political rights, which entail a duty of restraint, and the more aspirational socio-economic 
and cultural rights to which positive duties are attached
132
. In Fredman‘s own view, 
however, these two types of rights cannot be conceived as two entirely separate groups, 
as they inevitably overlap, and ―they cannot be coherently distinguished by the kind of 
duty to which they give rise‖
133
. The duties are rather shaped and limited by the ideology 
we use as a guide for our analysis of rights. For instance, civil and political rights 
examined with an understanding of freedom as non-intervention entail only negative 




As a simple example within the refugee protection context, the right to life and security 
cannot be infringed upon by the state for reasons of a person‘s race or national 
background. That state nevertheless has a duty to provide people who are being 
persecuted for such reasons with effective police or security forces and complaint 
                                                 
132
 Fredman, supra note 4 at 66. 
133
 Ibid. at 67. 
134
 Ibid.; Bastarache J. also recognizes this point in Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2001 SCC 94, 
[2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016 ¶ 19-28. 
 
 43 
mechanisms in case of corruption or misconduct. If one or both of these duties are 
unfulfilled, the target of persecution may legitimately seek asylum in a state that will 
fulfil them. This deconstruction of duties is embedded in the Refugee convention, but my 
analysis of complementary protection aims at attempting to see if such duties can be 
derived from other rights, which are not explicitly accounted for in the formal refugee 
definition. The presence of a duty to protect will be an indicator of the existence of a 
basis for complementary protection when this duty to protect is unfulfilled. 
Fredman develops a general analysis of the duty to protect based on the idea that the 
right-holder has to be protected from the perpetrator of the breach, without infringing on 
the possible competing rights of said perpetrator. Fredman uses the examples of the right 
to assembly, the right to life and the right not to be subjected to torture. In these different 
cases, the agent who opposes the right-holder has different levels of competing rights, 
such as the right to counter-demonstrate which opposes the right to assembly. She then 
demonstrates that the level of protection required from the state varies accordingly
135
. 
This consideration will be useful when determining at which point specific rights become 
a basis for a complementary protection regime. Indeed, the criteria that lead to the 
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2.4.UNHCR’s Obligations in Relation to States’ Responsibility for Protection 
Seekers 
As a body mandated by the UN General Assembly to assist governments in the 
repatriation or resettlement of refugees
136
, the UNHCR may be considered as a source of 
protection for asylum seekers outside of international treaties. This section briefly 
explores how the UNHCR expands and implements the protection offered by 
international refugee law and human rights instruments. This thesis centres on 
international treaties, but it remains relevant to observe other ways in which states 
manage to reach consensus on international protection of asylum seekers and their human 
rights. These mechanisms may reveal themselves to be a quicker way for states to 
respond to new emergencies and situations where international protection of groups or 
individuals is required. 
The first two subsections deal with the UNHCR‘s mandate and activities, in order to 
analyze how they have evolved beyond international treaties. Within this analysis, I 
weave in reflections on the UNHCR‘s position or importance in relation to international 
law and what it means for the interpretation of the latter. In the third section, I look into 
the interactions of the Canadian protection system with the UNHCR‘s activities. 
2.4.1. Complementary Protection Through the Evolution of the UNHCR 
Mandate 
The legal foundation of the UNHCR‘s statute is a UN General Assembly resolution, and 
the statute itself enables the General Assembly, as well as the Economic and Social 
Council, to adopt more resolutions that expand or amend said mandate
137
. These 
                                                 
136
 Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for refugees, GA Res. 428 (V), UN 
GAOR, 5th Sess., UN. Doc. A/RES/428(V) (1950) [UNHCR Statute]. 
137
 Article 3 UNHCR Statute: ―The High Commissioner shall follow policy directives given him by the 
 
 45 
resolutions generally fit into one of two types. These are general resolutions relating to 
the developments in refugee law and the UNHCR‘s mandate in general, and specific 
resolutions relating to situations arising in a given region or country
138
. The UNHCR‘s 
original mandate includes promoting the ratification of international conventions for the 
protection of refugees, promoting the admission and settlement of refugees, promoting 
and working with governments towards measures to improve the situation of refugees 
and reducing the numbers of persons requiring protection, as well as exchanging legal 
and other information on refugees with governments
139
. The term ―refugee‖ is defined 




                                                                                                                                                 
General Assembly or the Economic and Social Council.‖ 
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Hence, the UNHCR‘s mandate was originally limited to the application of the 1951 
Refugee Convention
141
, but as it was constituted by the General Assembly, later 
resolutions of the Assembly or the ECOSOC expanding its responsibilities or endorsing 
its initiatives have had the effect of continuously expanding the UNHCR‘s mandate, 
creating a distinction between the original 1950 Statute and the UNHCR‘s effective 
mandate
142
. The latter provides protection and assistance to different categories of 
persons within and outside of the Convention definition. Türk explains this widened 
mandate as follows: 
Demonstrating the underlying broad consensus of the international community to 
provide UNHCR with specific responsibilities in respect of certain groups of persons, 
successive General Assembly and ECOSOC resolutions, supported by UNHCR‘s 
Executive Committee, have had the effect of extending the High Commissioner‘s 
competence to five main categories: (i) refugees and asylum seekers; (ii) stateless 
persons; (iii) returnees; (iv) the internally displaced; and (v) persons threatened with 
displacement or otherwise at risk.
143
 
                                                                                                                                                 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being 
outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear or for reasons other 
than personal convenience, is unwilling to return to it. […] 
141
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One recent example of such a resolution is for assistance to refugees, returnees and 
displaced persons in Africa
144
. 
It appears that the evolved mandate of the UNHCR explicitly includes persons outside of 
the refugee definition, encompassing many other categories of persons who do not 
benefit from the protection of their state, or even those who are at risk of losing such 
protection. As such, the UNHCR‘s extended mandate could be considered as a 
complementary protection mechanism created by the international community.  
Some specific initiatives have been created to deal with situations where persons do not 
fit into the Convention definition of refugees, such as the cluster approach, which will be 
included in my discussion of natural disasters in chapter 5. This strategy is based on the 
spontaneous partnerships of international organisations and NGOs to provide a concerted 
effort of humanitarian assistance in situations such as natural disasters or armed conflict. 
Recent data have revealed that about half of the world‘s internally displaced persons
145
 
have been assisted through an arrangement in which UNHCR was the lead agency or a 
key partner
146
. The existence of such strategies for intervening in cases where individuals 
would otherwise remain unprotected, demonstrates that the UNHCR has the flexibility to 
adopt new initiatives that are later condoned by the General Assembly. 
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However, the idea that UNHCR would close gaps in international protection remains a 
source of discomfort and a recurring issue for the UNHCR
147
, as its statute and the 
resolutions that expand it are not international treaties. Therefore, the UNHCR‘s opinions 
are not a direct source of international law. Türk defines the UNHCR‘s position in the 
realm of international law in the following terms: 
UNHCR has the competence to develop progressively international law 
and standards relating to populations of concern. It is broadly recognized that the 
international legal framework is generally adequate to cover various forms of forced 
displacement, but there is a continuing need to supplement and substantiate some of 
its aspects, to identify normative gaps and to fill those through the progressive 
development of law standards.
148
 
Despite the perhaps overly optimistic assessment of the adequacy of the international 
legal framework, this statement rightfully defines the UNHCR as a standard-setting 
organization. Its initiatives and interpretations become customary through approval by 
the General Assembly, which suggests approval by the international community. Because 
they tend to harmonize national interpretations of international law through their 
influence on state refugee protection systems
149
, the UNHCR agents appear to strive 
towards building customary interpretations of international law. They may also influence 
the drafting of international conventions and their application within individual states. 
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2.4.2. The UNHCR’s Executive Committee Resolutions and their Normative 
Value 
The UNHCR‘s main vehicle as an international standard setting organization is its 
Executive Committee. The Executive Committee was established by resolution of the 
General Assembly in 1957 and originally required to have twenty to twenty-five 
members
150
. Following successive enlargements over the years, its membership has 
recently increased to seventy-eight
151
. The Executive Committee‘s role is to advise the 
UNHCR as to its statutory functions and deciding whether to provide protection and 
assistance when specific refugee problems arise
152
. It essentially manages the way the 
UNHCR fulfils its mandate, and as such, it must interpret the scope of the mandate and 
the extent of international protection that is attributed to displaced persons under 
international law. 
Within the realm of complementary international protection, the Executive Committee 
has recognized that individuals who do not fit within the Convention definition may need 
international protection and deserve a legal status in the country of asylum. It generally 
accepts that all individuals who are facing displacement, coupled with lack of protection, 
fall under the mandate of the UNHCR
153
. In their discussion on complementary 
protection, the Committee mainly vies for inclusive protection regimes and status 
determination based mainly on protection needs, by stating: 
Beneficiaries of complementary protection should be identified according to their 
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international protection needs, and treated in conformity with those needs and their 
human rights.  The criteria for refugee status in the 1951 Convention should be 
interpreted in such a manner that individuals who fulfil the criteria are so recognized 




The Executive Committee thus recognizes the importance of creating complementary 
forms of protection, but warns against the use of complementary protection mechanisms, 
which do not benefit from a universal definition, to deny rights to refugees. It also 
encourages the UNHCR to engage in discussions with states to develop adequate 
protection regimes for protection needs outside of the Refugee Convention
155
. 
The Executive Committee‘s activities further strengthen the connection between 
international refugee law and international human rights law, through the constant 
affirmation of the humanitarian nature of international protection
156
. Its decisions also 
frequently refer to the importance of considering the specific needs of women and 
children faced with refugee situations
157
. Through its contribution to a wide definition of 
―refugee‖, the Committee has assisted vulnerable persons who otherwise would not have 
been protected for reasons such as inability to leave their country. In sum, the Executive 
Committee‘s conclusions may be considered as acceptance by the international 
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community of the humanitarian activities of the UNHCR and openness to new forms of 
protection. However, they remain non-binding for states, and it is possible that the same 
states that are on the Committee would be less generous when drafting a binding legal 
instrument. 
2.4.3. Effects of the UNHCR Mandate on the Canadian Refugee Protection 
Regime 
Since the legal basis for the UNHCR and the state obligations attached to it are UN 
General Assembly resolutions, they are not binding for member states. The statute of the 
UNHCR, nonetheless, appeals to states‘ cooperation in the fulfilment of the mandate it 
sets out. The General Assembly essentially calls upon states to cooperate with UNHCR 
activities and ratify all conventions that provide international protection
158
. The mandate 
of the UNHCR thus encompasses all the obligations that states have through treaty law, 
but expands beyond it. Canada does not have such an extensive mandate as the UNHCR 
does, but is bound to cooperate with it as a member of the international community. 
The UNHCR has, nonetheless, had a direct and continuous influence on Canadian 
refugee law. The UNHCR‘s intervention is not only justified under its mandate, it is also 
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welcomed in most stages of status determination. Indeed, the IRPA explicitly allows 
agents of the UNHCR to attend a refugee status determination hearing
159
. 
From this study of the evolution of international protection and the conceptual framework 
of international protection and international human rights law, this thesis now turns to an 
application of various human rights instruments to the international protection context. 
The first of these will be the right not to be subjected to torture as provided for by the 
Convention Against Torture.  
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Chapter 3. The Expansion of Protection by the Convention Against Torture and 
the Principle of Non-Refoulement 
The principle of non-refoulement emerged along with the international definition of 
refugee status, and is the cornerstone of this chapter. Formerly applicable exclusively to 
persons already recognized as refugees and included in article 33 of the Refugee 
Convention itself, it is now more widely used to protect any person from return to a 
country where it is likely that they will face torture or cruel or unusual treatment. The 
inclusion of the right to non-refoulement within article 3 of the Convention Against 
Torture formally links it with the prohibition of torture and consecrates its expansion to 
all persons regardless of refugee status, thus transforming it into a mechanism of 
complementary international protection. This chapter seeks to untangle the different uses 
of the principle of non-refoulement, along with an overview of the state duties it creates. 
This will form a basis for determining whether Canada complies with the obligations 
created by this complementary international protection mechanism. 
I begin my analysis by examining the prohibition of torture from the historical and 
theoretical point of view, in order to make sense of the right not to be subjected to torture 
as an element of non-refoulement. An analysis of the state duties related to the 
prohibition of torture will be helpful to gain a deeper understanding of the obligations 
with regards to non-refoulement. In the following section, I delimit the scope of non-
refoulement and justify its qualification as a mechanism of international complementary 
protection. I apply my theoretical analysis of state duties with regards to torture to the 
exclusions to non-refoulement. Finally, I use these reflections to evaluate the integration 
of these duties in Canadian law through different sections of the IRPA and case law. 
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3.1.The Prohibition of Torture 
3.1.1. The Origins and Legal Basis for the Prohibition of Torture 
The core element of a complementary international protection mechanism based on non-
refoulement in the Convention Against Torture (CAT) is the prohibition of torture itself. 
The CAT is a new legal suppression of a millennial practice that was widespread among 
European civilizations. A striking characteristic of the study of early practices of torture 
is the moral dilemma that accompanies it. For example, according to the principles 
guiding the administration of torture in Roman times, information obtained under torture 
could not be used as main evidence in a trial, but could complete evidence already 
acquired through other means
160
. In addition to the unwritten rule that it should be used in 
moderation, some principles were used by the Romans to limit the practice in terms of the 
age or health condition of the subject
161
. This suggests that though the practice was legal, 
it was often not considered defensible from a moral point of view. 
Another pattern that emerges is that torture was more commonly used on individuals who 
were not considered as right-holders, as was the case of heretics during the Middle Ages, 
or even individuals who were not considered as citizens or human beings, as it appears 
through records of it being inflicted more commonly on slaves in the Roman Empire
162
. 
Such categorizations of individuals excluded some people from civil rights, and this 
denotes a moral impetus prohibiting the practice of torture on individuals who could, 
indeed, benefit from civil rights. Nonetheless, it was not recognized as a moral 
requirement to spare individuals accused of a crime from the practice, as it remained a 
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common method for establishing ancillary evidence until the late 18
th
 century. It was 
discarded by European governments based on rational and logical demonstrations by 
criminologists such as Beccaria
163
, which showed that it was not an effective method of 
proof and too often resulted in the punishment of innocent people
164
. 
The resurgence of torture under 20
th
 century totalitarian regimes, along with other horrific 
human rights violations, prompted the international community to prohibit it in article 5 
of the UDHR in 1948
165
. The practice was, nonetheless, commonly used by European 
states for political control during the cold war era, as reported in cases presented before 
the European Court of Human Rights
166
. At the same time, Amnesty International 
spearheaded an international campaign for the eradication of torture
167
. These efforts to 
specifically tackle the persistence of torture were mirrored by the United Nations, with 
the inclusion of the prohibition of torture in Article 7 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1966
168
, and the adoption of the Declaration on the 
Protection of all Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
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Degrading Treatment or Punishment
169
 in 1975. It was then renewed and strengthened 
with the first legally binding Convention Against Torture (CAT) in 1984
170
.  
The CAT contains a detailed definition of torture in article 1, which includes the 
infliction of severe pain or suffering by a public official, with the exception of suffering 
arising from a lawful sanction
171
. The CAT requires that states undertake measures to 
eliminate torture within their own territory, as well as measures such as non-
refoulement
172
, which are meant to avoid supporting or encouraging the practice in other 
states. Article 3 of CAT codifies the principle of non-refoulement, stating that no one 
shall be returned to a state where they face a risk of torture. In paragraph 3(1), it states the 
prohibition to return anyone to ―another State where there are substantial grounds for 
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture‖. Paragraph 3(2) 
clarifies the nature of the ―substantial grounds‖, stating that they cover ―all relevant 
considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a 
consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights‖. This suggests 
that general non-compliance with international human rights of a state of origin can 
become a basis for granting asylum. 
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According to the travaux préparatoires surrounding article 3 of CAT and non-
refoulement, much of the discussion centred around paragraph 3(2) and whether it should 
contain examples of what constitutes a ―consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass 
violations of human rights‖
173
. Interestingly, the Canadian delegation expressed 
disappointment with the fact that paragraph 3(1) only mentions torture, leaving out cruel 
and unusual treatment or punishment
174
.  
The prohibition of torture is known as a jus cogens norm in international law, which is 
one that allows for no derogation whatsoever
175
. It appears easy to assert that a strong 
normative base in both international treaties and international customary law prohibits the 
use of torture, but this view has been challenged
176
. Watson writes that ―[if] one is 
disposed to adopt a positivistic approach to legal rules, equating legal validity with the 
identification and reiteration of ―official‖ written norms, rather than with norms which 
are efficacious, then such a treaty regime establishes a satisfactory body of prohibitive 
rules‖
177
. He goes on to make the point that ―[if], on the other hand, one is less concerned 
with the world of conceptualism than with the realm of reality, then the fact that there is 
widespread state practice in violation of the treaty regime is still very relevant‖
178
. 
This sheds light on the fact that a norm that could be considered strong and as a source of 
pride for the international legal system may upon closer examination reveal itself to be 
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ineffective. It is also consistent with the history of torture, which shows that it was 
considered immoral, but was still widely perpetrated through centuries. It is a valid point, 
and the text of the CAT itself suggests an awareness of the possible non-compliance of 
states with this prohibition. 
The clearest indication of that awareness is the provision for asylum within the 
Convention. It includes not only the obligation to provide international protection from 
torture, but also a commitment not to encourage or endorse states that are known to 
practice torture. This could be a sign that the inclusion of asylum grounds in an 
international human rights instrument is not merely meant to compensate for the absence 
of an asylum convention, but also a way to make the protection of international human 
rights more efficient in providing shelter from non-complying states. 
3.1.2. State Duties and Interests in Relation to Torture and Non-
Refoulement 
As mentioned before, Fredman‘s theory of state duties regarding the protection of human 
rights is useful for untangling the connections between the state, the right-holder, and the 
perpetrator of the breach of human rights. In the model she uses, she demonstrates that 
the competing rights and interests of the state and the perpetrator of the breach limit an 
individual‘s rights, and that different individual rights create varying levels of competing 




Accordingly, as a jus cogens norm, or an absolute right, the right not to be subjected to 
torture does not allow much weight to be allotted to the rights of the perpetrator of the 
                                                 
179
 Fredman, supra note 4 at 73-76. 
 
 59 
breach, as would be the case, for instance, if we were dealing with the right of 
assembly
180
. Fredman describes the state‘s duty to protect as a very strong one in 
unequivocal terms: 
This can be seen in Z v UK
181
, which concerned a claim that the State had failed in its 
duty to protect children against inhuman and degrading treatment inflicted by their 
parents. In this case, the Court stressed that ‗Article 3 enshrines one of the most 
fundamental values of democratic society‘. This leads to a strong duty to protect, 
deriving from the obligation under Article 1 of the Convention to secure to everyone 




Hence, when it comes to torture and non-refoulement, the state‘s duty involves more than 
merely taking reasonable steps to protect the right. It has a duty to guarantee individuals 
to be free from torture or cruel and degrading treatment or punishment
183
. 
In relation to Watson‘s criticism that a norm cannot be considered as effective unless it is 
always respected, Fredman proposes a more nuanced view. She has shown that most 
rights pose a problem of indeterminacy and competing principles, but the right not to be 
subject to torture is an absolute one, and as such, involves a more rigid obligation from 
the state. Although it is not absolutely respected in practice, it is at least widely 
recognized and applied as such by courts, whereas other human rights involve a weighing 
of competing rights
184
. Despite criticism regarding its application, the prohibition of 
torture may thus be appropriately qualified as a jus cogens norm. 
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3.2.Theory of Non-Refoulement 
The complementary protection mechanism contained in article 3 CAT is an example and 
a renewed use of the principle of non-refoulement. Generally, this principle holds that 
―no refugee should be returned to any country where he or she is likely to face 
persecution or torture‖
185
. This definition brings out the question of whether the principle 
applies only to refugees. I have already outlined through the history and evolution of 
refugee law and asylum practices that non-refoulement was conceived as a right 
pertaining to persons who had already been recognized as refugees
186
. However, the 
inclusion of the principle in article 3 of CAT makes no mention of refugees, as it refers to 
persons in general. Hence, this section proposes to clarify the definition and scope of the 
principle of non-refoulement, before moving on to a justification of its qualification as 
complementary protection, and a discussion of exclusions to the principle. 
3.2.1. Definition and Scope 
The association between non-refoulement and refugee or asylum provisions originates in 
early to mid-nineteenth century, when the principle of non-extradition or non-rejection 
became associated with the possibility of persecution
187
. Previously, refoulement was 
merely a term referring to summary return to the frontier of aliens who did not possess 
appropriate identification
188
. Goodwin-Gill‘s inquiry into the history of non-refoulement 
as a sidekick to the development of refugee protection leads him to the conclusion that  
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the right to non-refoulement, as expressed in article 33 of the Refugee Convention, is a 
rule ―clearly designed to benefit the refugee‖
189
. 
Goodwin-Gill remains aware of the reality beyond the Convention‘s design; he expresses 
concern that the application of such a principle would be predicated on a person already 
being recognized as a refugee by the state
190
. This indeed creates a loophole that 
significantly limits the scope of the principle, because it means that individuals may be 
returned to torture while their status determination is pending. Goodwin-Gill evaluated 
state practice in the application of article 33 of the Refugee Convention. His research 
revealed that, despite a few instances where state practice confirms a restrictive view of 
non-refoulement as applicable only to recognized refugees, the principle has generally 
evolved to be applicable as soon as asylum seekers arrive at the frontier, hence rejecting 
the idea of dependence upon status recognition
191
. His view is that state practice closes 
the protection gap created between entry and status recognition, and the application of 
article 33 to asylum seekers ―at least during an initial period and in appropriate 
circumstances‖
192
 has become a customary norm. 
Stenberg reaches the same conclusion. He bases his argument in part on the original legal 
signification of the verb ‗refouler‘ in French, which expresses a right of non-return upon 
entry. Its use in the English version of article 33 of the Refugee Convention without 
translation thus conveys the same meaning
193
. Although both Stenberg and Goodwin-Gill 
recognize that article 33 may apply to persons who have entered the country seeking 
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refuge before they benefit from refugee status, it is still applicable only to persons who 
are refugees, and not to persons who may seek protection based on grounds outside of the 
Refugee Convention. As a result, it would not apply to other asylum seekers upon entry. 
Hence, there is room for an expansion of the principle by the CAT. 
Regardless of the original intention behind article 33 of the Refugee Convention, the 
principle of non-refoulement has evolved through state practice in the 40 years following 
its adoption, as well as by a number of UN resolutions
194
. This point is demonstrated 
through examples of state practice such as the ―B status‖ in Sweden, which is a domestic 
mechanism of alternative protection
195
. It is also evidenced through regional treaties such 
as the 1969 Organization for African Unity Convention on Refugee Problems in Africa
196
 
and the Cartagena Declaration of 1984
197
, which contain provisions for the application 
of non-refoulement to persons beyond the refugee definition who are threatened by 
violence or by massive human rights violations
198
. The subsequent use of non-
refoulement in a general treaty aimed at prohibiting torture seems to be merely the next 
logical step in the expansion of the scope of the principle of non-refoulement. 
Non-refoulement within the framework of CAT applies ―to everyone, irrespective of their 
nationality or legal status, whether they are inside or outside their country of origin and 
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whether or not they fear being harmed for reasons of discrimination‖
199
. This does not 
mean that the protection offered by article 3 of CAT is without its limits. More precisely, 
based on the objective of this provision and the concept of national protection, ―it is fair 
to suggest that in cases of dual or multiple nationality the prohibition on refoulement does 
not apply in situations in which the person concerned can obtain protection from another 
country of which he is a national‖
200
, since ―a person applying for protection from 
refoulement must first seek protection from his own State rather than a foreign one‖
201
. 
Furthermore, the association of non-refoulement with torture brings its own set of 
caveats, due to the scope of the definition of torture in article 1 CAT. The definition 
contains requirements in terms of the intent of the perpetrator, which must be either 
linked to the interest or policies of the state, or perpetrated by a representative of the 
state. It also includes requirements regarding the purpose for which torture is practiced
202
. 
In contrast, the European Court of Human rights, in its judgments on cases involving 
torture, holds no requirements as to the perpetrators and the motives, but all the cases it 
was presented with so far involved only torture emanating from state policy
203
. 
Also, the definition of torture in CAT explicitly excludes pain or suffering inherent to 
lawful sanctions. This raises issues, as it could not have been intended in the CAT to 
allow states to disguise torture as a lawful sanction
204
. Indications as to what could not be 
excluded from the definition, even if labelled a ―lawful sanction‖, lies in the body of 
decisions from the Committee Against Torture as well as reports of the UN Commission 
                                                 
199
 Cornelis W. Wouters, International Legal Standards for the Protection from Refoulement (Oxford: 






 Ibid. 534-535. 
203





on Human Rights. They have named a number of specific actions that constitute torture 
regardless of circumstances
205
. Examples include conduct such as extraction of nails, 
burns, electric shock and deprivation of senses
206
. 
This thesis is primarily concerned with situations where persecution is perpetrated by the 
state. However, it also considers situations where the persecutor is unrelated to the state, 
and the latter is unable to protect its national or resident. Instances of torture in the 
context of organized crime or domestic violence could potentially fit within this scenario. 
From the foregoing, it appears that such situations are excluded from the scope of article 
3 of CAT. Freshwater uncovered that during the drafting of the CAT, the state parties 
concluded that ―if torture is committed by a private actor, in normal circumstances, the 
government of the home country should take responsibility for protecting its citizens and 
punishing the perpetrators‖
207
. Apparently, ―[the] Convention was intended to deal with 
the problem that arises when the authorities of a country are involved, a situation in 
which the normal ―machinery of [...] prosecution and punishment‖ by the home 
government might not operate to perform its responsibilities with respect to its 
citizens‖
208




This original intention of the drafters of CAT begs the question as to whether it is 
possible to claim protection under article 3 CAT when the persecutor is unrelated to the 
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state. If the public element is an absolute requirement, article 3 CAT only partially relates 
to the concept of protection as herein defined, and does not provide complete protection.  
The definition of torture in article 1 requires only  ―consent or acquiescence‖
210
 of a 
public official to the practice of torture for the convention to be triggered. The dictionary 
definition of ―acquiescence‖ is ― to accept something reluctantly but without protest‖
211
. 
This suggests that where the perpetrator of torture is not linked with the state, the practice 
still amounts to torture when the state is aware of it, but fails to intervene. The UN 
Committee Against Torture and other UN bodies have issued few comments on the 
intended use of this word. One key comment from the UN Commission on Human rights 
stated: ―A head of State, also in his or her capacity as commander-in-chief, should […] 
not authorize his or her subordinates to use torture, or guarantee immunity to the authors 
and co-authors of and accomplices to torture‖
212
. This statement supports the 
interpretation of acquiescence as allowing torture to occur without necessarily instigating 
it. 
Accordingly, a United States Senate resolution stated that ―the term ‗acquiescence‘ 
requires that the public official, prior to the activity constituting torture, have awareness 
of such activity and thereafter breach his legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such 
activity‖
213
. A study of the drafting of the definition also reveals that these words were 
added for the purpose of encompassing acts that are tolerated by the state
214
. Such an 
interpretation widens the personal scope of the CAT and makes it a legal basis for a 
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personal claim for asylum motivated by another state‘s failure to protect, but it still 
appears to exclude situations where a government acts but does not succeed in preventing 
the risk of torture. 
With all these considerations in mind, the following section is  dedicated to a further 
examination of the rationale behind the qualification of the CAT as a complementary 
international protection instrument. 
3.2.2. Qualification as Complementary Protection 
If the CAT can be considered as a source for a complementary protection mechanism, it 
is only as a result of a modern interpretation of this treaty, since it was initially designed 
to expand on the general prohibition in article 5 UDHR and article 7 ICCPR and allow 
for a more effective eradication of torture
215
. Its use as a complementary international 
protection mechanism appears to stem more from the way it has been implemented in 
some states and the political pressure it creates, rather than from the objective and text of 
the treaty itself. 
According to McAdam, the requirement of state complicity with torture in article 1 CAT 
is one that limits the range of article 3 CAT as a source for international protection 
claims
216
. The lack of clarity as to the lawful sanctions exception adds yet another dent 
into that protection mechanism
217
. Hence, although the presence of this provision for non-
refoulement in the CAT can be considered as a statement in favour of the universality of 
the principle, and an escape for victims of torture
218
, it does not accomplish this in and of 
itself. Article 3 of CAT depends on actions undertaken by the state in order to be used as 
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an independent mechanism of protection from the Refugee Convention. McAdam further 
points out that this article‘s efficiency is dependent upon recognition of the competence 
of the Committee Against Torture by state parties: 
 Unless a state has made a declaration under article 22 CAT
219
 recognizing the 
competence of the Torture Committee to hear individual claims against the State, it 
will be very difficult for a person to successfully invoke protection from refoulement 
under article 3. Even if a State‘s obligations under other international treaties, 
regional treaties, and customary international law prevent refoulement, the relief to 
which an applicant will be entitled depends on the obligations which the State has 
implemented domestically, and the mechanisms available for complaints to be 
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At this point, although 108 states have ratified the Convention, only 39 have made a 
declaration pertaining to the competence of the Committee
221
. 
Thus, it appears that article 3 of CAT becomes a mechanism for complementary 
international protection by becoming a source for alternative protection mechanisms on 
the domestic level and individual claims to the Committee Against torture. The latter is a 
weaker source of protection, as the Committee‘s decisions are not binding on a State and 
cannot be materially enforced.  
The power of article 3 of CAT lies in the fact that it universalizes non-refoulement and 
creates pressure for it to be upheld in domestic legislation. Similarly, the Committee‘s 
decisions may still serve as public denunciations of non-compliance with the Convention, 
and as such, exert a level of political pressure on the states involved. Gorlick remarks that 
―[not] only has the Committee been able to prevent the refoulement of individual asylum 
seekers who are likely to be subject to torture, but through its State party reporting 
procedure some States have been prompted to re-examine their laws and practices related 
to refugee protection‖
222
. His scrutiny of the structure of the Committee‘s decisions on 
article 3 CAT brought him to the conclusion that the reasoning behind them is similar to 
refugee status determination decisions at the domestic level
223
. He also raises concerns as 
to the cases that were turned away by the Committee due to a strict application of the 
rules contained in article 22 CAT
224
. It may be due to a legitimate concern that the 
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Committee is not meant to be an international appeal board for refugees
225
, but it also 
means that the success of article 3 of CAT as a complementary protection mechanism 
truly depends on domestic implementation among the state parties. 
3.2.3. Exclusions 
Beyond the limitations inherent in the definition of torture under the CAT, and those 
related to the refugee definition underlying article 33 of the Refugee Convention, there is 
an ongoing doctrinal discussion on exclusions to the principle. Article 3 of CAT is 
absolute, and non-refoulement contains no exclusions. However, the Refugee Convention 
defines situations where people are excluded from relying on the right to non-
refoulement. I have previously mentioned the jus cogens nature of the prohibition of 
torture. Making sense of the debate on whether non-refoulement may also be considered  
a jus cogens international rule will be primordial for evaluating the extent of Canada‘s 
obligations with regards to this principle. 
Jean Allain considers that the only way to make sure that states never return any person 
to another state where they face a risk of torture is to demonstrate that non-refoulement, 
like torture itself, is a jus cogens norm in international law, one which carries no 
exclusions
226
. He does so by examining state practice, more specifically ― [the] practice 
of States in not forcibly repatriating refugees must […] be shown to be based on the 
belief (opinio juris) that they themselves are bound by a legal obligation not to do so, and 
that such an obligation is binding on them as a matter of jus cogens‖
227
. Using many 
examples of the affirmation of non-refoulement as a jus cogens norm in customary 
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international law, while downplaying the importance of violations of the rule, Allain 
insists that non-refoulement is indeed a rule without exceptions
228
. 
Although Allain‘s view is based on highly detailed research and analysis, it considers 
only the refugee protection regime, and the right of non-refoulement of refugee 
claimants. It demonstrates that the identification of ―safe third countries‖
229
 may easily 
lead to refoulement of refugees by limiting their ability to make claims
230
, but it fails to 
consider the expressly stated exclusions in article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention and 
how they, in fact, may lead to refoulement
231
. Neither does his argument include a 
discussion on the existence of exceptions to non-refoulement as applied in article 3 of 
CAT. In spite of the importance of customary international law in determining a state‘s 
obligations, it is important to consider that written exclusions might be integrated into 
international legal instruments, and to evaluate to what extent states may avail themselves 
of such exclusions. 
There are two exclusions in article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention, which are evaluated 
with respect to the country of asylum. The first is that there are reasonable grounds for 
believing the person to be a danger to the country in which they seek asylum, and the 
second is that the claimant has been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly 
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serious crime. The two are separate and alternative
232
. The threshold necessary to 
consider the refugee as a threat to the security of the country is considered by scholars to 
be very high. For example, Bruin and Wouters state: 
Although Article 33 (2) Refugee Convention does not specify the facts and 
circumstances that constitute a danger to the national security and leaves a margin of 
appreciation for States, the Article does demand a level of risk substantiated by proof. 
The threshold is high. It applies to persons who try to overthrow the government by 
force or other illegal means, who are endangering the constitution, the territorial 
integrity, the independence or the peace of the country of refuge.
233
 
Examples of serious crimes for which conviction leads to exclusion mentioned by 
drafters of the Refugee Convention include rape, homicide, armed robbery and arson
234
, 
and the criminal conviction must result from a final judgment. A claimant may also be 
denied refugee status through the exceptions in article 1(F) of the Refugee Convention
235
. 
The latter requires a lower standard of proof, but the claimant must be believed to have 
committed a serious non-political crime, a war crime or acts contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations
236
. Duffy qualifies these exclusions in the following 
manner. 
[The] stipulated exclusions are extremely limited and were meant to target only those 
who had committed an ‗indisputably wrong act‘, extraditable criminals, or in 1(F)(a) 
those who are believed to have committed, ‗a crime against humanity, as defined in 
the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such 
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As such, these exceptions should only apply to a relatively small subset of asylum 
seekers. 
The above grounds for refoulement are in apparent contradiction to the formulation of 
non-refoulement in article 3 of CAT, which contains no explicit exclusions. Scholars 
affirm that its main feature is that it is absolute and non-derogable
238
. Indeed, the 
Committee Against Torture has stated that the principle of non-refoulement, when it 
comes to torture, applies even to those associated with terrorism
239
. This view also 
benefits from some scholarly support. Duffy states: 
It could be argued that non-refoulement is a fundamental component of the customary 
prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. 
With 90 per cent of the world's sovereign states party to a treaty which prohibits 
refoulement in some shape or form, does this sufficiently establish the normative 
status of non-refoulement in international law? The incorporation of this principle 
into key international instruments is also testament to consistent practice and a strong 
opinio juris which contributes to the creation of a customary norm
240
. 
The qualification of non-refoulement as a strong component of the prohibition on torture 
implies that this prohibition cannot be respected as jus cogens if refoulement to states that 
practice torture persists. The link between non-refoulement and the prohibition on torture 
makes a strong point for the jus cogens nature of non-refoulement. 
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In order to reconcile the existence of exclusions in one of the instruments with the 
absolute and non-derogable character of the other, it is possible to conclude that 
exclusions are possible even when a person would fit the definition of refugee and face 
persecution, as long as this persecution does not amount to torture. This opinion has 
garnered support among scholars, some of whom also include other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment in the types of persecution that preclude 
refoulement
241
. In cases where torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or 
punishment are not involved, a balancing test between the risk of persecution faced by 
the claimant and the risk the claimant potentially presents to the country of refuge may be 
done by courts to determine if removal is allowed
242
. 
Furthermore, states have been known to rely on diplomatic assurances that the asylum 
seeker will not be subject to torture when returned to another state. This practice has been 
submitted to the scrutiny of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights 
on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
243
. The 
Rapporteur‘s report asserts that diplomatic assurances should not be used to get around 
the absolute rule of non-refoulement. The main problem is the absence of certainty that 
both parties are making the agreement in good faith and that it will not be breached. 
There are no mechanisms to sanction such agreements and they are not legally binding
244
.  
In addition, within a context of complementary international protection, a diplomatic 
assurance may be given by a state that is willing to protect the individual, but still unable 
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to do so. A person may be in need and deserving of protection by the state of asylum 
despite a diplomatic assurance. This, and all other foregoing considerations with regards 
to non-refoulement will be assessed against Canadian domestic law to see if it is in tune 
with its international obligations as a state of asylum. 
3.3.Integration into Canadian Law 
3.3.1. Inclusion of Non-Refoulement within Canadian Legislation 
One object of this thesis is to apply the international obligations sketched out in the 
previous section to Canadian domestic law, with a view to evaluating our state‘s 
compliance with the treaty obligations it set out to uphold. Having ratified both the 
Refugee Convention
245
 and the Convention Against Torture
246
, Canada has undeniable 
obligations to respect the principle of non-refoulement, both towards refugees and other 
persons seeking protection. I have discussed the principle of non-refoulement as 
articulated in both international instruments in order to better assess the concept itself, but 
this section is concerned with the inclusion of the non-refoulement obligations under the 
CAT into alternative protection mechanisms in Canada. 
Although not explicitly written as such, section 97 IRPA is arguably an embodiment of 
non-refoulement in Canadian law
247
. The existing scholarly analysis of this section is 
very limited, but it does suggest it is the main legislative expression of complementary 
international protection in this country. At this point, it might be helpful to reiterate the 
text of section 97 IRPA. 
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97. (1) A person in need of protection is a person in Canada whose removal to their 
country or countries of nationality or, if they do not have a country of nationality, 
their country of former habitual residence, would subject them personally 
(a) to a danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of torture within the meaning 
of Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture; or 
(b) to a risk to their life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment if 
(i) the person is unable or, because of that risk, unwilling to avail themself of the 
protection of that country, 
(ii) the risk would be faced by the person in every part of that country and is not faced 
generally by other individuals in or from that country, 
(iii) the risk is not inherent or incidental to lawful sanctions, unless imposed in 
disregard of accepted international standards, and 
(iv) the risk is not caused by the inability of that country to provide adequate health or 
medical care. 
 (2) A person in Canada who is a member of a class of persons prescribed by the 
regulations as being in need of protection is also a person in need of protection. 
At first glance, subsection 97(1)(a) contains all the elements of the principle of non-
refoulement, as it precludes the return of an individual to a country where they face 
torture within the meaning of article 1 of CAT. This rule thus carries the same limitations 
on state-related perpetrators and lawful sanctions, as the CAT itself.  
I have observed earlier that the Canadian delegation had expressed disappointment as to 
the fact that cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment had been excluded 
from article 3 of CAT, which establishes the absolute principle of non-refoulement. It is 
consistent with this sentiment that non-refoulement in subsection 97(1)(b) expands to a 
risk to life or of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. Subsection 97(1)(b)(iii) also 
mirrors the definition of torture in CAT by including the limitation related to lawful 
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sanctions. However, new limitations are added through subsections 97(1)(b)(ii) and 
97(1)(b)(iv), which require that the risk be personalized and that it not be caused by the 
inability of the country to provide adequate healthcare. 
Interestingly, subsection 97(1)(b)(i) rejects the limitation as to state actors, opting instead 
to call for proof that the other state be unable or unwilling to protect the claimant. In 
doing so, it clearly and explicitly makes the concept of ―person in need of protection‖ 
analogous to the definition of refugee, by integrating the concept of protection as it is 
seen in international refugee law. On the other hand, nowhere in subsection 97(1) is there 
mention of non-refoulement or article 3 of CAT, which contains this rule and proclaims 
its peremptory nature. Non-refoulement is only explicitly guaranteed by Canadian 
legislation once a claim has been processed and protection granted
248
. It is possible that 
these references have been overlooked in order to avoid the absolute nature of non-
refoulement and to allow for exceptions regarding individuals whose status has yet to be 
determined. 
Hence, it appears that the idea behind section 97 IRPA was to integrate non-refoulement 
as it is articulated in the Refugee Convention, while widening its personal scope and 
using the CAT to clarify the notion of torture. This interpretation is strengthened by the 
text of section 98 IRPA which states that ―[a] person referred to in section E or F of 
Article 1 of the Refugee Convention is not a Convention refugee or a person in need of 
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. It is possible that these sections have been chosen because they allow 
rejection of claimants without assessment of their refugee or protection claims. This 
contrasts with paragraph 33(2), which allows for the exclusion of claimants after 




Hathaway and Harvey have extensively analyzed the article 1(E) and 1(F) exclusions that 
are mentioned in section 98 IRPA. They warn against the use of the article 1(F) exclusion 
on serious criminality, arguing that ―in relying on the peremptory Article 1(F) procedure 
to deny refugee status for safety and security reasons that are relevant only to an 
application to authorize refoulement under Article 33(2), governments contravene 
international refugee law‖
251
. They suggest that governments may be tempted to apply 
only the article 1(E) or article 1(F) exclusions, and to apply it to a wider range of criminal 
offences than it is allowed by international refugee law. They explain the importance of 
meeting the procedural standards for the application of exclusions in these terms: 
Governments are entitled to invoke an expansive range of concerns to justify a denial 
of protection on the grounds of safety or security, but only if they are prepared to 
meet the more demanding procedural requirements of Article 33(2). States that act 
under Article 1(F) to vindicate safety and security interests effectively demand the 
best of both worlds, denying the critical balance at the heart of the Refugee 
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Convention between refugee rights and asylum-state interests
252
. 
I return to this exclusion in the next subsection to determine if Canada has only applied 
section 98 IRPA to serious criminals, as it should. 
The only other provision similar to paragraph 33(2) of the Refugee Convention is section 
115 IRPA
253
, which targets individuals already recognized as refugees and carries similar 
exclusions on grounds of serious criminality. It is also labelled as the ―principle of non-
refoulement‖ within the Act. It is thus arguable that the Act meant to include non-
refoulement in its oldest sense, that is, non-removal of persons who already benefit from 
refugee status, without applying it to other persons whose status determination is 
pending. This section entitles the Minister to issue a ―danger opinion‖ on refugees who 
possess a criminal record, which balances the level of risk the refugee represents for 
Canadian society against the risk he faces if returned to his country of origin or 
nationality
254
. If the former outweighs the latter, the refugee may be deported. 
 
 




 Section 115 IRPA: ―(1) A protected person or a person who is recognized as a Convention refugee by 
another country to which the person may be returned shall not be removed from Canada to a country where 
they would be at risk of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group or political opinion or at risk of torture or cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply in the case of a person 
(a) who is inadmissible on grounds of serious criminality and who constitutes, in the opinion of the 
Minister, a danger to the public in Canada; or 
(b) who is inadmissible on grounds of security, violating human or international rights or organized 
criminality if, in the opinion of the Minister, the person should not be allowed to remain in Canada on the 
basis of the nature and severity of acts committed or of danger to the security of Canada. 
(3) A person, after a determination under paragraph 101(1)(e) that the person‘s claim is ineligible, is to be 
sent to the country from which the person came to Canada, but may be sent to another country if that 
country is designated under subsection 102(1) or if the country from which the person came to Canada has 
rejected their claim for refugee protection.‖ 
254




3.3.2. Use of the Principle of Non-Refoulement in Canadian Case Law 
Perhaps one of the most important ways of evaluating the extent of Canada‘s obligations 
as well as compliance with these obligations, is to look into the legal opinions expressed 
by domestic courts. In relation to the prohibition of refoulement to a state where there is a 




 cases are fundamental, as they reflect 
the Supreme Court‘s opinion on both Canada‘s international obligations, and the way 
they should be implemented domestically. 
In the Suresh case, the appellant had already gained refugee status and was facing 
deportation due to his allegiance to an allegedly terrorist organization. His contention was 
that he would face torture if he were returned to Sri Lanka. Despite his having already 
obtained refugee status in Canada, the reasoning of the Court with regards to non-
refoulement may be equally applicable to persons seeking protection in Canada. 
Interestingly, the Court addresses the apparent contradiction between the exclusions in 
the Refugee Convention and the peremptory nature of non-refoulement in the CAT, and 
seems to conclude that the latter prevails. The Court thus presented its analysis of the 
scope of the CAT: 
It is not apparent to us that the clear prohibitions on torture in the CAT were intended 
to be derogable. First, the absence of an express prohibition against derogation in Art. 
3 of the CAT together with the "without prejudice" language of Art. 16
257
 do not 
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contained in articles 10, 11, 12 and 13 shall apply with the substitution for references to torture or 
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seem to permit derogation. Nor does it follow from the assertion in Art. 2(2) of 
CAT
258
 that "[n]o . . . exceptional circumstances . . . may be invoked as a justification 
of torture," that the absence of such a clause in the Art. 3 refoulement provision 
permits acts leading to torture in exceptional circumstances. Moreover, the history of 
Art. 16 of the CAT suggests that it was intended to leave the door open to other legal 
instruments providing greater protection, not to serve as the means for reducing 
protection. During the deliberations of the Working Group that drafted the CAT, Art. 
16 was characterized as a "saving clause affirming the continued validity of other 
instruments prohibiting punishments or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment": 
Convention against Torture, travaux préparatoires, at p. 66. This undermines the 
suggestion that Art. 16 can be used as a means of narrowing the scope of protection 
that the CAT was intended to provide.
259
   
Further on, the Court affirms, based on these arguments as well as recommendations 
from the UN Committee Against Torture, that the CAT should be considered as the 
prevailing international instrument over the Refugee Convention. It would indeed make 
little sense to deny refugees rights that the CAT provides to all individuals without 
discrimination
260
. From this, the Court reaches the conclusion that international law 
prohibits deportation to torture regardless of national security interests
261
. 
Following the Court‘s insightful analysis on the contradictions of international law on 
non-refoulement, their analysis under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
opens the door to exclusions to that principle. 
We conclude that generally to deport a refugee, where there are grounds to believe 
                                                                                                                                                 
2. The provisions of this Convention are without prejudice to the provisions of any other international 
instrument or national law which prohibit cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment or which 
relate to extradition or expulsion.‖ 
258
 Article 2(2) CAT: ―No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat or war, 
internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.‖ 
259
 Suresh, supra note 255 ¶ 71. 
260
 Ibid. ¶ 72-73 
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 Ibid. ¶ 75. 
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that this would subject the refugee to a substantial risk of torture, would 
unconstitutionally violate the Charter's s. 7 guarantee of life, liberty and security of 
the person. This said, we leave open the possibility that in an exceptional case such 




This particular passage has been the subject of vehement criticism
263
. One of the voices 
that rose up against it is the UN Committee Against Torture, which expressed concern at 
the Court‘s failure to recognize the absolute nature of the principle of non-refoulement in 
this case
264





 of the Charter, which makes the Court‘s analysis an open door to 
violations of international law. 
The Court‘s reasoning may be linked with the UNHCR‘s involvement as an intervener in 
the Suresh case
267
. Its participation was justified by its mandate in overseeing the 
application of treaties relating to refugees. In the factum submitted to the Supreme Court 
of Canada, the UNHCR emphasizes the need to apply the Refugee Convention along with 
the Convention Against Torture and ICCPR, thus underlining the interplay between 
refugee law and human rights. The UNHCR contends that an interpretation of 
international law is the key to interpreting domestic law within this case
268
. The High 
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264
 UN Committee Against Torture, Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee against Torture: 
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 Article 1 of the Charter: ―The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and 
freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society.‖ 
266
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Commissioner‘s factum recognizes that the prohibition on refoulement in article 3(1) of 
CAT is absolute, while that of article 33 of the Refugee Convention contains exclusion. 
However, it puts forth the idea that the CAT prevails on the Refugee Convention, based 
on three arguments. The first reason is the fact that it was ratified later
269
. Also, the 
factum states that treaties are to be interpreted in accordance with the evolving 
international human rights context
270
, and finally, that article 5 of the Refugee 
Convention opens to more benefits being allotted to individuals through other treaties
271
. 
However, through an application of the proportionality test
272
 developed in the Oakes
273
 
case, the UNHCR concludes: ―refoulement can only be justified under article 33(2) of the 
Refugee Convention if there is a very serious threat to the security of the country of 
refuge that is proportional to the risk faced by the refugee upon refoulement‖
274
. The 
UNHCR‘s position could thus have been the basis for the Supreme Court‘s decision to 
                                                                                                                                                 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR"), 8 March 2001, online: UNHCR Refworld 
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 UNHCR Factum, supra note 268 at 2. 
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allow for the application of this rule and allow for exceptions to non-refoulement
275
. In 
addition, section 1 of the Charter is only used to save any section 7 violation in 
exceptional circumstances. Also, the UNHCR‘s brief does not account for the court‘s 
opinion that exceptions to the principle of non-refoulement can be created through the 
fundamental justice balance in section 7 as well as under section 1 of the Charter. 
The other Supreme Court case worth mentioning in an analysis of complementary 
protection based on non-refoulement is Pushpanathan. Of particular interest in this case 
is the Court‘s majority opinion on the difference between article 33 of the Refugee 
Convention and article 1F of the same Convention. 
Article 1F(b) contains a balancing mechanism in so far as the specific adjectives 
"serious" and "non-political" must be satisfied, while Article 33(2) as implemented in 
the Act by ss. 53 and 19
276
 provides for weighing of the seriousness of the danger 
posed to Canadian society against the danger of persecution upon refoulement. This 
approach reflects the intention of the signatory states to create a humanitarian balance 
between the individual in fear of persecution on the one hand, and the legitimate 
concern of states to sanction criminal activity on the other. The presence of Article 
1F(b) suggests that even a serious non-political crime such as drug trafficking should 
not be included in Article 1F(c). This is consistent with the expression of opinion of 
the delegates in the Collected Travaux Préparatoires of the 1951 Geneva Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, vol. III, 86, at p. 89.
277
 
Hence, it would appear that article 1(F) distinguishes itself from article 33 by adding 
criteria to the process of determining whether a person is a refugee or a person in need of 
protection. Since the status granted to both categories of claimants under IRPA is the 
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, it would appear logical to create an alternative protection mechanism without 
compromising on the requirement that the protected person cannot be a persecutor. 
Adversely, article 33 would be concerned with the refoulement of refugees (or protected 
persons, since they benefit from the same legal status) once protection has been granted. 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not yet had the opportunity to analyze section 97 
IRPA‘s compliance with Canada‘s international obligation of non-refoulement. The 
Federal Court has nevertheless made a brief statement on the relationship between section 
97 IRPA and article 3 CAT.  
Paragraph 97(1)(a) of the Act refers specifically to the notion of torture contained in 
Article 1 of the Convention and therefore integrates the principles contained in 
Article 3 of the Convention. Consequently, the answer to this question is contained in 
the law itself and does not require certification.
279
 
This statement has then been incorporated into subsequent judgments by the federal 
court
280
. It reflects a position that had been adopted before the enactment of section 97 
IRPA, according to which article 3 of CAT is only concerned with individuals who have 
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gone through the determination process and have been denied refugee status
281
. In 
practice, this means that claimants who are denied a hearing to decide whether they are 
refugees or persons in need of protection, based on the exclusions of section 98, cannot 
claim that their right to non-refoulement has been violated.  
Hence, the right to non-refoulement is almost absolute, as determined in the Suresh case, 
for persons who are allowed to present their refugee claims. However, courts have found 
that it can be subject to exceptions in the context of pre-removal risk assessment 
(PRRA)
282
. PRRA is a process by which a person may apply for protection when they are 
about to be returned
283
, and the determination of risk is made based on the criteria in 
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sections 96 to 98 IRPA
284
. There are also circumstances under which the application for 
protection may only result in stay of removal, such as serious criminality or a violation of 
human rights
285
. The Federal Court‘s opinion in Xie is that individuals excluded under 
section 98 IRPA, which provides for rejection based on article 1(F) of the Refugee 
Convention, can make a claim for protection under section 112 and obtain stay of 
removal, but they are meant to be rejected from refugee protection
286
. This opinion was 
followed and referred to with approbation in several other cases
287
. This means that a 
person who is excluded under section 98 IRPA can demonstrate that they should not be 
returned, but they are not allowed protection as herein defined. 
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From these observations, it appears that the Federal Court is trying to minimize Canada‘s 
international obligations in order to reconcile them with the structure of the IRPA, rather 
than reassess the validity of the IRPA as part of an international legal framework. The 
Supreme Court judgments in Suresh and Pushpanathan are also flawed as they open to 
the possibility of individuals being returned to torture. They were based on legislation 
which was repealed with the adoption of the new IRPA in 2001, but these findings have 
not been readjusted by the Federal Court in light of the legislative reform and the 
adoption of sections 97 and 98 IRPA, which have added new protection provisions. This 
adds difficulty to the interpretation and application of these new provisions.  
From this analysis of the implementation of the prohibition on torture and refoulement in 
the IRPA, this thesis now turns to the examination of how civil and political rights 
generally impact on traditional and alternative protection mechanisms. 
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Chapter 4. General Protection Based on Civil and Political Rights 
Classic refugee protection is a palliative regime, which appears to draw inspiration from 
civil and political rights as it expands from the non-discrimination provision in article 2 
of the UDHR
288
, to a measure preventing persecution based on discriminatory grounds
289
. 
Just as article 2 was meant to guarantee all other rights contained in the UDHR 
irrespective of civil and political status, the Refugee Convention aims to guarantee the 
possibility to reside in a state which guarantees core rights to persons of all races, 
religions, nationalities, political opinions or social groups. In spite of this apparent 
connection between refugee protection and civil and political rights, there may be 
persisting protection gaps between the 1951 Refugee Convention and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which entered into force in 1976. This chapter 
identifies such protection gaps, and finds out if and to what extent the ICCPR can be used 
as a complementary protection mechanism. 
Although I have dealt extensively with the principle of non-refoulement in Chapter 3, the 
CAT is not the only instrument that guarantees it. Therefore, in the first section, I 
examine which rights in the ICCPR are applicable to refugees, starting with non-
refoulement and how its scope differs from that in CAT. I then examine other refugee-
specific rights contained in the ICCPR. I conclude the first section by examining a few 
regional human rights and refugee protection instruments and making sense of them in 
light of civil and political rights. This sets up the framework for the second and last 
                                                 
288
 Article 2 UDHR: ―Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, 
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the 
basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person 
belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.‖ 
289
 James C. Hathaway, ―Reconceiving Refugee Law as Human Rights Protection‖, (1991) 4 Journal of 
Refugee Studies 112 at 120-121. 
 
 89 
section, in which I look at how the ICCPR is interpreted in light of the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms and the IRPA, as well as in specific case law regarding refugee 
protection and removal orders. 
4.1.Refugee-Specific Rights in the ICCPR 
4.1.1. Non-Refoulement through the ICCPR 
Most discussions of the principle of non-refoulement include article 7 ICCPR
290
. It 
provides for a general prohibition of torture, but makes no explicit mention of asylum or 
the principle of non-refoulement. The link to non-refoulement has been created by case 
law and opinions from the Human Rights Committee, which is the implementing body of 
the Covenant. Interestingly, the Committee has recognized that return to a country where 
an individual faces a risk of torture, or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment would be contrary to provisions of the ICCPR in two important cases out of 
Canada.  
In Ng v. Canada
291
, the applicant faced extradition to the United States, where he was 
likely to be subject to the death penalty by asphyxiation. In this situation, the Committee 
decided that the treatment he was likely to be subjected to was in violation of article 7 
ICCPR, and therefore challenged the legality of the extradition from which this treatment 
would result. In Judge v. Canada
292
, however, no violation of article 7 was recognized, 
but the Committee concluded that the extradition of the claimant to face the death penalty 
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 Article 7 ICCPR: ―No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
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in the United States would violate the right to life embodied in article 6 ICCPR
293
. It is 
not clear from such interpretations that they translate into asylum mechanisms, but it has 




Wouters argues that article 2(1) ICCPR
295
 enables the principle of non-refoulement 
contained in articles 6 and 7 ICCPR by outlining a far reaching personal scope for the 
rights contained in the Covenant. The absence of limitations as to the legal, political or 
social status opens to the possibility of protection from refoulement to individuals who do 
not benefit from refugee status
296
. From this reasoning, it becomes plausible that these 
articles of the ICCPR may be used to protect persons without distinctions.  
The territorial scope of article 2(1) remains limited by the addition of the words ―within 
its territory and subject to its jurisdiction‖, which were interpreted in light of the object of 
the Covenant and with a view to avoid absurd results in the application of the Covenant 
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pardon or commutation of the sentence of death may be granted in all cases.  
5. Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age and 
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rights as referring to individuals within the state party‘s territory or subject to its 
jurisdiction
297
. For asylum seekers, this means that their rights should be protected by the 
country where they seek refuge. The Human Rights Committee also remains a strong 
source for the interpretation of the territorial scope of the Covenant
298
. In relation to non-
refoulement, Wouters summarizes the Committee‘s opinion and its implications. 
According to the Committee, while States are responsible for guaranteeing the rights 
of the Covenant to all individuals under their control when it comes to the prohibition 
on refoulement the State has an obligation only not to remove those individuals from 
within its territory. This would imply that no obligations exist towards people who are 
not within the State party‘s territory. This would, for example, exclude individuals 
who were at the de facto border of the States [and] individuals seeking asylum at the 
embassy of the State party […].
299
 
According to Wouters, these examples may be considered as situations where the state 
party has effective control over the individuals, and as such, may qualify as instances 
where the state has jurisdiction. However, this argument is not explicitly accounted for by 
the official sources of interpretation for the Covenant
300
. Nonetheless, one may conclude 
that Canada has an undeniable obligation to uphold the rights defined in articles 6 and 7 
ICCPR as well as an obligation not to put these rights at risk by returning individuals to a 
country where they are threatened. 
In terms of the material scope of the protection from refoulement derived from the 
ICCPR, the most eye-catching feature is that article 7 ICCPR prevents both torture and 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. As such, it is said to widen the 
                                                 
297
 Ibid. at 370-371. 
298
 Human Rights Committee, General comment no. 31 [80], The nature of the general legal obligation 
imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, HRC, 80th Sess., UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.1 (2004) ¶ 
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material scope of article 3 CAT
301
. According to the HRC, ―[it] is the duty of the State 
party to afford everyone protection through legislative and other measures as may be 
necessary against the acts prohibited by article 7, whether inflicted by people acting in 
their official capacity, outside their official capacity or in a private capacity‖
302
. Because 
of article 7, the ICCPR can even be said to be complementary within the realm of 
complementary international protection. It strengthens and adds substance to 
complementary protection mechanisms by forging far-reaching fundamental rights and 
principles.  
McAdam, however, takes a somewhat contrary position and argues that the ICCPR is 
―the least suitable instrument for complementary protection‖
303
. She considers that 
―[although] some ICCPR rights are [relatively] expansive, and the HRC‘s proceedings 
are comparatively shorter and its views simpler, these do not outweigh its restrictive 
evidence, inconsistent reasoning, and the fact that it has considered comparatively few 
removal cases‖
304
. She comes to this conclusion by setting it against the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), a status-granting regional instrument.  
This rejection of the ICCPR as a complementary international protection mechanism 
because of the flawed procedure of its implementing body and its inability to grant status 
appears to be inconsistent with her assessment of the CAT, which she qualifies as a 
complementary protection mechanism. Although the Committee attached to the CAT 
seems to be more effective and the subject of less criticism, the fact that it has high 
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requirements to hear a case strongly suggests that it is not meant to be the main recourse 
for individuals seeking relief under the CAT. The HRC presumably serves a similar 
purpose as a last resort when state jurisdictions do not recognize violations of ICCPR-
based rights.  
The HRC has also issued a series of general comments on the interpretation and 
application of the ICCPR, one of which makes a statement on the principle of non-
refoulement. 
[The] article 2 obligation requiring that States Parties respect and ensure the Covenant 
rights for all persons in their territory and all persons under their control entails an 
obligation not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their 
territory, where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of 
irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant, either 
in the country to which removal is to be effected or in any country to which the 
person may subsequently be removed. The relevant judicial and administrative 
authorities should be made aware of the need to ensure compliance with the Covenant 
obligations in such matters.
305
 
The Committee then goes on to specify that the domestic legislation of the state parties 
should be made to comply with this principle and to give effect to other ICCPR rights
306
. 
Additionally, in case of discrepancy between the national and international laws, 
domestic legislation should be adjusted to fit into the ICCPR framework
307
. 
As such, both treaties prevent refoulement, but do not create a status resulting from non-
refoulement. The CAT only goes further than the ICCPR in stating the prohibition of 
refoulement in explicit terms. They both depend on state parties to create such status and 
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implement stronger domestic provisions to strengthen these international human rights. In 
my view, both instruments can be qualified as complementary international protection 
instruments that depend upon the creation of alternative protection mechanisms on the 
domestic level in order to be fully effective. 
4.1.2. Other Refugee-Specific Rights in the ICCPR 
Non-refoulement may be a strong source of complementary international protection, but 
it is not the only one. If other rights are taken into consideration in conjunction with that 
of non-refoulement, the ICCPR becomes not only an additional basis for protection, but 
also sets minimum standards for the rights granted to protection seekers. This section is 
dedicated to a discussion of refugee-specific rights other than non-refoulement in the 
ICCPR. 




 ICCPR, which 
pertain to the rights of aliens. They allow aliens who are lawfully in the territory of a state 
to benefit from liberty of movement, and the right not to be expelled unless there are 
public security concerns. In its general comment on the position of aliens under the 
Covenant, the Committee has reaffirmed that aliens benefit from all the rights contained 
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in the Covenant, barring a few exceptions, based on article 2 ICCPR
310
, which provides 
for the application of rights without discrimination to individuals within the state‘s 
jurisdiction. I have previously outlined article 2 ICCPR as the key to the principle of non-
refoulement, but it opens the door to the application of a plethora of other rights for 
aliens, which include protection seekers. 
The right to enter a territory that is recognized in article 12 ICCPR is limited by states‘ 
local legislation, as indicated by the word ―lawfully‖. The HRC adds a few exceptions to 
this seemingly clear rule of state prerogative. 
The Covenant does not recognize the right of aliens to enter or reside in the territory 
of a State party.  It is in principle a matter for the State to decide whom it will admit 
to its territory.  However, in certain circumstances an alien may enjoy the protection 
of the Covenant even in relation to entry or residence, for example, when 
considerations of non-discrimination, prohibition of inhuman treatment and respect 
for family life arise.
311
 
This statement confirms once again the principle of non-refoulement, but adds two new 
considerations of great importance for aliens. The idea of respect for family life will be 
explored in greater detail in chapter 6. Considerations of non-discrimination are the most 
pivotal for this section. They imply that aliens who find themselves within the territory 
and jurisdiction of the state, and thus under the impetus of article 2, benefit from a 
number of fundamental rights regardless of how they entered the territory. Because these 
rights are guaranteed by the host state, it can be said to create a certain form of protection 
for persons seeking asylum in this state. 
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Aliens‘ right to non-discrimination in the Covenant applies to all rights but those 
specifically relating to citizens. Some rights also explicitly mention the prohibition of 
discrimination, such as article 26 ICCPR, which guarantees equality before the law
312
. 
Aliens also benefit from basic rights such as the right to life, liberty and security of the 
person as well as the freedom of thought, conscience and religion
313
. However, the 
Committee‘s opinion is not entirely clear as to the extent to which all these rights apply to 
aliens who are not lawfully within the territory of the state. 
The right to procedural fairness for aliens is particularly strengthened by article 13 
ICCPR, which provides that expulsion or removal cannot be executed without a fair 
decision in accordance with domestic law. However, this right is only afforded to aliens 
who enter the territory lawfully, thus excluding large numbers of asylum seekers. In that 
sense, the rights contained in the Covenant are not quite refugee-specific as they do not 
take into direct consideration the possibility that a person entering illegally may present a 
claim for protection, unlike the Refugee Convention in its article 31
314
. Nonetheless, the 
interpretation of the principle of non-refoulement as having a wide scope may complete 
the gap in article 13 and allow for the elimination of distinctions between aliens based on 
the legality of their presence. 
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All in all, none of the rights guaranteed to aliens in the Covenant appear as strong and 
far-reaching as that of non-refoulement, but they do provide aliens with fundamental 
guarantees against discrimination and a certain level of procedural fairness. From this, we 
may conclude that the ICCPR aims to set basic standards for domestic protection regimes 
without becoming a mechanism for protection in itself or granting a specific status. 
Further, non-refoulement is the only truly preventive right in the Covenant, other rights 
only being enforceable if a violation occurs. Hence, the rights of aliens under the 
Covenant are not refugee-specific rights as defined in chapter 2, but they encompass 
some or all of protection seekers through their general formulation. 
4.1.3. Implementation of Refugee-Specific Rights in Regional International 
Instruments 
The preceding interpretation of ICCPR rights in relation to asylum seekers reveals that 
the Covenant sets standards for domestic asylum regimes while reaffirming and 
expanding the principle of refoulement. Since it cannot be used as an independent 
complementary protection mechanism, it would be pertinent to examine how it relates to 
regional international instruments, as such agreements reflect the consensus of a group of 
states and thus form a part of international law while portraying a more specific 
interpretation of ICCPR obligations. 
The ICCPR‘s prohibition on refoulement is very similar to that in article 3
315
 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
 316
. This article merely prohibits torture 
and inhuman treatment or punishment, but the European Convention enforcing body, the 
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European Court of Human rights, has established in its case law that returning a person to 
a country where they face such harm would be a breach of article 3 of ECHR
317
. The 
jurisprudence of the Court has recognized and reaffirmed the absolute nature of non-
refoulement, thus rendering the ECHR equivalent to the CAT in its prohibition of 
refoulement.  
As homologous as this prohibition might seem to the interpretation of the ICCPR by the 
HRC, it is considered as a significantly stronger source of complementary protection due 
to the higher efficiency and consistency of its implementing body
318
. More than a simple 
criticism of the ICCPR, the functional superiority of such a regional instrument reinforces 
the idea that the principles in an aspiring universal international instrument cannot be 
realized without domestic or regional implementation.  
The Convention governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (OAU 
Convention) was adopted in the same decade as the ICCPR. It reiterates the Refugee 
Convention definition
319
, but also extends the meaning of the term ―refugee‖. It defines 
the term thusly: 
The term "refugee" shall also apply to every person who, owing to external 
aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public 
order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to 
leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside 
his country of origin or nationality.
320
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This expansion of the definition of refugee allows for individuals to seek asylum when 
public security is severely compromised by civil strife or armed conflicts. It recognizes 
that in certain situations, people may fall victim to persecution on a random basis, and 
that the right to life
321
 is not fulfilled if such persons are not allowed to seek the 
protection of neighbouring states. It also recognizes the risk that torture or cruel treatment 
may be inflicted on an arbitrary basis on account of such disturbances of public order, 
thus respecting article 7 ICCPR. 
The definition weaves in elements of the principle of non-refoulement, as persons who 
are at a substantial risk to their life benefit from the protection of the African Convention 
as refugees. This convention further solidifies the principle of non-refoulement by 
prohibiting rejection at the frontier
322
 and compelling states of the Organization of the 
African Unity (OAU) to ensure, to the best of their ability, the settlement of individuals 
who fit into this expanded definition of refugee
323
. 
Interestingly, article 3 of the OAU Convention prohibits refugees from engaging in 
various forms of ―subversive‖ activity in addition to the obligation to conform to the 
asylum country‘s laws and regulations. These activities include causing or aggravating 
tension through the media, which is an acknowledgment that protection in times of 
political instability comes at the cost of political freedom and freedom of speech
324
. This 
concern with the minimization of refugee-related political tension is also reflected in 
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These provisions demonstrate awareness of the political echo that comes with the 
granting of asylum. It is hardly surprising, since the history of asylum abounds with 
examples of states using diplomatic protection for individuals sought after because of 
their political activity as a statement in favour of said activity. I have mentioned 
examples of this in chapter 2. The African Convention marks an evolution of refugee 
protection as a humanitarian issue. Nevertheless, the political repercussions are likely the 
main reasons all states have not expanded the refugee definition to include victims of 
generalized political instability. Also, many states may be reluctant to limit freedom of 
expression to guarantee the purely humanitarian nature of refugee protection. 
The latest relevant regional instrument is the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees. It 
was adopted at a colloquium entitled ―Coloquio Sobre la Proteccíon Internacional de los 
Refugiados en América Central, México y Panamá: Problemas Jurídicos y 
Humanitarios‖, and represents an example of cooperation between Central American 
states. This non-binding instrument calls for the adoption and implementation of the 1951 
Refugee Convention and cooperation with the UNHCR
326
, while promoting a focus on 
the roots of refugee problems
327
 and reaffirming the humanitarian nature of refugee 
protection with a view to limit political tensions while respecting refugees‘ human 
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. The Colloquium‘s conclusions take example from the OAU Convention 
concerning the expansion of the refugee definition
329
, the reaffirmation of the absolute 
nature of non-refoulement
330
, and maintaining the purely humanitarian nature of refugee 
protection
331
. On the down side, this document produces no strict legal obligation upon 
the participating states. 
This presentation of regional refugee protection instruments in conjunction with the 
ICCPR shows that in practice it has been less likely for a universal binding treaty such as 
the latter to serve as an independent asylum mechanism. It is a source of many principles 
and the rights it contains could clearly be better protected by an expansion of the 1951 
refugee definition. The aforementioned regional instruments are better geared towards the 
specific needs of individuals seeking protection, be it with stronger enforcement 
mechanisms like the ECHR, or by being centred specifically around refugee and asylum 
issues, as is the case of the OAU Convention and the Cartagena Declaration. Hence the 
ICCPR may serve as a source of inspiration for principles of complementary protection, 
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but it relies mostly on regional and domestic measures to ensure that all the human rights 
it guarantees are, indeed, respected in the context of displacement.  
4.2.Implementation in Canadian Law and Policy 
4.2.1. Human Rights Law in Canadian Immigration and Constitutional Law 
Officially, international instruments to which Canada is a party are not binding until they 
are implemented into domestic law
332
. An obvious example of such implementation in 
our field of interest is article 96 IRPA, which recites the exact text of the article 1(A)(2) 
Refugee Convention definition, or article 97 IRPA, which makes direct reference to 
article 1 of the CAT. Although the ICCPR has not been subject to such implementation, it 
is undeniable that its principles have coloured the Canadian Charter
333
. This sub-section 
examines the application of the ICCPR in cases dealing with the Charter and more 
specifically, those dealing with Charter rights in relation to asylum. First, I further 




 cases, as well as in 
section 97 IRPA, and then discuss the problematic application of the principles of 
fundamental justice in relation to the right to present a claim for protection. 
Bassan has conducted a study of cases relating to the Charter, which reveals that 
international human rights treaties are routinely used by the Courts when they are asked 
to review the constitutionality of domestic laws. She recognizes the theoretical 
differences between implemented and unimplemented treaties, but argues, in light of the 
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body of court cases considering the Charter, that the judicial use of international human 
rights law has tended to overlook those differences
336
. Her analysis of Charter-related 
case law reveals that the recourse to international human rights instruments by courts 
does not obey any specific rules and is therefore unpredictable
337
. ―Thus, the willingness 
to consider international conventional law is not impeded by the constitutional rule that 
unimplemented treaties are not part of the domestic law of Canada‖
338
. Rather, there 
seems to be a presumption in the interpretation of Canadian law that the legislator does 
not intend to violate international law instruments, which results in the frequent use of the 
ICCPR and ECHR by the Supreme Court
339
. 
In the Suresh case
340
, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the deportation of 
an individual to a country where they face a risk of torture is, in most cases, incompatible 
with principles of fundamental justice. 
Insofar as Canada is unable to deport a person where there are substantial grounds to 
believe he or she would be tortured on return, this is not because Art. 3 of the CAT 
directly constrains the actions of the Canadian government, but because the 
fundamental justice balance under s. 7 of the Charter generally precludes deportation 
to torture when applied on a case-by-case basis. We may predict that it will rarely be 
struck in favour of expulsion where there is a serious risk of torture. However, as the 
matter is one of balance, precise prediction is elusive.
341
 
This passage reveals that the Court considers deportation to face torture illegal in light of 
the constitution and rejects Canada‘s obligations under international law as a source for 
this prohibition. The Court does not recognize that the Charter constitutes the domestic 
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implementation of human rights such as the right to life and security of the person. The 
wording of the Court‘s opinion and, more specifically, the use of the word ―directly‖, 
suggest that international law still indirectly constrains the actions of the Canadian 
government. 
Furthermore, the previously mentioned extradition cases before the human rights 
committee are similar to the Burns case
342
 before the Supreme Court. It involved the 
constitutional analysis of the extradition of the respondents, two murder suspects, to the 
state of Washington, without prior assurance that they would not be subjected to the 
death penalty. In this case, the Court considers the prohibition of cruel and unusual 
treatment or punishment under section 12 of the Charter, but it makes no mention of the 
influence of the same prohibition in the ICCPR. The Ng decision
343
 considered the 
method employed to carry out the death penalty, asphyxiation, as part of the reasons why 
it constitutes cruel punishment, but the Supreme Court has not considered this factor in 
this case. It decides that the decision should not be made under section 12, but under the 
balancing process of the principles of fundamental justice in section 7
344
 and under the 
section 1 proportionality test. The Court found that extradition without assurances  that 
capital punishment would not be imposed violated the respondents' rights under section 7 
of the Charter
345
 and could not be justified under section 1
346
. Despite ruling in favour of 
the respondents, the Court fails to consider ICCPR rights and HRC decisions in its 
discussion of the case. It, nonetheless, recognizes that Canadian principles of 
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fundamental justice have evolved since the domestic adjudication of the Ng case, and that 
they now go against the constitutionality of extradition to face the death penalty. 
Notably, it can be said that paragraph 97(2) IRPA implements the non-refoulement 
obligations contained in the ICCPR, as it extends the principle to individuals who face a 
risk of cruel, unusual or inhuman treatment or punishment
347
. I have already pointed out 
that, in doing so, it goes further than the obligations set out for parties to the CAT. 
Further, procedural rights and equality before the law of aliens who are not refugees, as 
defined in articles 13 and 26 of ICCPR, are also guaranteed by section 97 of IRPA. Like 
claims made under section 96 of IRPA, persons in need of protection go through a 
hearing process before an IRB member. 
Overall, the Canadian legislation appears to be influenced by the principles contained in 
the ICCPR in matters relating to international protection, but there is no explicit reference 
to it in the IRPA or the Charter. Paragraphs 2(b), (c) and (e) IRPA acknowledge in 
general terms Canada‘s ―humanitarian ideals‖, ―international obligations‖, as well as  its 
commitment to ―human rights and fundamental freedoms of all human beings‖ without 
explicit mention of any human rights protection instrument
348
. The ICCPR is more likely 
to be continuously used as an interpretive tool in asylum case law, as a result of the 
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presumption that Canadian legislation is consistent with international treaties to which 
Canada is a party
349
. 
In addition, part of the UNHCR‘s and states‘ obligations outlined by the UN General 
Assembly is to partake in agreements and cooperate in order to reduce the number of 
people needing protection. Canada‘s acknowledgement of these further obligations is 
seen primarily through the adoption of various policies, and not through law. For 
example, Canada has implemented a resettlement program that ―places emphasis on the 
protection of refugees and people in refugee-like situations by providing a durable 
solution to persons in need of resettlement‖
350
. These refugee-like situations include 
violations of human rights as a result of war, or other generalized massive violations of 




This program allows for assistance for a predetermined number of individuals, in addition 
to applications for private sponsorships
352
. It provides resettlement for individuals 
referred by the UNHCR or by private sponsors, and comprises an ―Urgent Protection 
Program‖ which responds to requests by the UNHCR for the protection of individuals 
who face an immediate threat to their life
353
. Other measures are targeted at refugees with 
special needs such as women or children
354
. 
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This policy is a notable example of the influence of human rights on Canada‘s asylum 
regime is the country‘s general cooperation with the UNHCR. This collaboration is tied 
to some provisions in the IRPA regulations, but is not part of the IRPA itself. It allows 
protection for persons who may not be able to make the journey to Canada to present a 
claim for themselves, and opens to new refugee-like situations, such as violations of 
human rights in situations of armed conflict.  As such, it presents an alternative protection 
option, which conforms with Canada‘s humanitarian commitments. However, it remains 
limited when it comes to the wider protection of social, economic and cultural rights, and 
does not present a program of assistance for victims of natural disasters, an issue that I 
will discuss further in chapter 5. 
4.2.2. The Right to a Full Hearing and Access to State Territory 
The Charter makes clear distinctions between individuals who benefit from a status and 
those who do not, as section 6, regarding freedom of movement, refers to citizens and 
permanent residents, while sections 2 and 7 to 14 extend protection of fundamental rights 
to everyone
355
. At the time of Bassan‘s study, which was before the last legislative reform 
of the IRPA, the Supreme Court had already issued its decision in the Singh
356
 case. This 
case was the first example of refugee claimants who had failed in their claim, but argued 
that their removal would be a violation of section 7 of the Charter, which generally 
mirrors articles 6 and 9 of the ICCPR. The judges concluded that the term ―everyone‖ 
encompassed a broader class of persons than citizens and permanent residents, and so 
included refugee claimants. They further noted that returning them to a country where 
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they face a threat to their life would be a violation of section 7 of the Charter
357
. The 
Court went on to observe that the procedure for refugee status determination did not 
allow the claimants to effectively challenge a rejection of their claim, and as such it was 
contrary to principles of fundamental justice
358
 and could not be justified under section 1 
of the Charter
359
.  They thus reached the conclusion that this breach could be avoided by 
allowing the claimants a chance to demonstrate their refugee status through an oral 
hearing. 
Bassan argues that the Singh case allows the definition of ―security of the person‖ as 
freedom from state-imposed psychological stress
360
. 
The significance of this decision is that ―security of the person‖ can be engaged by 
state-imposed psychological stress felt by aliens who, in this case, feared punishment 
abroad. The limitation of the case is that it was based on the procedural content of the 
principles of fundamental justice; it is clear that the aliens had no substantive right 
per se to seek asylum in Canada.
361
 
The claimants only challenged the procedural rules contained in the Immigration Act, and 
did not ask for the recognition of a right of non-refoulement. The case does not actually 
deal with the notion of state-imposed psychological stress, but it arguably could have 
gone further than the procedural content to examine what happens to claimants who face 
a risk to their life and do not fit the Convention refugee definition. Hence, in this 
decision, the Supreme Court judges attempted to ensure the fulfilment of the right to life 
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by demanding a fair hearing process, without turning the Charter into an alternative 
protection mechanism. 
Hathaway and Neve point out that the right to a hearing of every claim on its merits 
remains conditional upon territorial access. The success of the screening process at the 
border results in legal presence on the territory of the state of refuge
362
. A foreign 
national, at a port of entry, may only be deemed admissible by immigration officers if 
they find no ―reasonable grounds to believe‖ that the individual falls under sections 34 to 
42 of IRPA. These provisions identify grounds for inadmissibility that include national 
security, violating international human rights, serious criminality, organized criminality, 
health grounds, financial reasons, misinterpretation, non-compliance with the act or an 
inadmissible family member. Only when a claimant is admissible can he or she remain in 
the country in order to present a protection claim. 
According to sections 44 and 45 IPRA, if an officer finds an individual inadmissible, they 
prepare a report, after which an admissibility hearing takes place. This hearing can result 
in the admittance of the individual for further examination under subsection 45(c) of 
IRPA, which can apply to asylum seekers. 
However, there is no guarantee that an admissibility hearing based on 34 to 37 of IRPA, 
which provide for inadmissibility based on grounds of different forms of criminality, will 
include consideration of the possible risk faced by the foreign national who seeks entry. 
The absolute nature of non-refoulement requires a careful weighing of the evidence that 
the claimant faces a substantial risk of torture, a process which can only be achieved 
                                                 
362
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fairly through a hearing of the claim on its merits. The determination of inadmissibility 
may only be reversed by an appeal to the Minister, whose decision is discretionary.  
Despite this possibility, the fact remains that sections 34 to 37 IRPA only require taking 
into consideration the criminal background of the individual, without consideration for 
the risk faced by said individual. The wording of these sections allows the literal 
application of the distinction, within articles 12 and 13 of the ICCPR, between aliens who 
are lawfully in the state territory and those who are not. The HRC‘s interpretation of this 
article requires that exceptions be made when the alien faces a risk to her life.  
Hathaway and Neve also argue that these inadmissibility provisions can preclude refugee 





 cases, that Courts have not found this to be contrary 
to the principles of the Charter. This position has been confirmed in several subsequent 
cases
365
. In a more recent analysis based on these accessibility provisions and policy 
statements by the government, Bossin has concluded that the IRPA was drafted with a 
view to limit access to refugee status determination
366
. The IRPA thus fails to consider 
the jus cogens nature of non-refoulement, and effectively violates article 31 of the 
Refugee Convention, which aims to prevent penalties for claimants who enter the country 
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of refuge without authorization. The Court‘s interpretation of IRPA seems to base the 
right to make a claim on the legal entry into the territory of the state of refuge.  
Such a result is also in apparent contradiction with section 2 IRPA, which states that one 
of the first objectives of the Act is to save lives and offer of protection to the displaced 
and persecuted
367
. The same section, in subsection (e), establishes the importance of fair 
and efficient procedures that respect human rights and fundamental freedoms. Security 
concerns are only mentioned at the bottom of the list
368
. The manner in which sections 34 
to 37 IRPA may be applied, in light of the jurisprudence, does not take into consideration 
the human rights that the law itself states as being the most important within the refugee 
protection regime. 
The Courts may generally be deemed to be aware of the importance of using human 
rights, including far-reaching instruments such as the ICCPR, to guide the interpretation 
of the protection mechanisms offered by the Canadian legislation. Nevertheless, the 
courts‘ interpretations in many cases allow for loopholes that the ICCPR does not permit 
and that are inconsistent with the legislation itself. 
Civil and political rights, even those as fundamental as the right to life and the right to not 
to be subjected to torture, are not entirely respected in Canada‘s domestic approach to 
international protection. This thesis will now delve into the even more difficult 
application of social, economic and cultural rights within the realm of international 
protection. 
                                                 
367
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Chapter 5. Protection Obligations Based on Social, Economic and Cultural 
Rights 
Now that I have dissected the prohibition of torture and other civil and political rights as 
sources for complementary forms of asylum, it is worth expanding the scope of this thesis 
to an analysis of social, economic and cultural rights as bases for asylum. I continue with 
the same method, beginning with a discussion of a socio-economic basis for asylum 
founded in international law, and then exploring how it applies in Canadian domestic 
law. 
First, I discuss international obligations related to socio-economic rights in a general 
theoretical sense, and then apply them to more specific situations. Those will be natural 
disasters, as they are situations where socio-economic rights may be difficult to fulfil, and 
the inability to provide adequate health care, as it is of particular concern in Canadian 
asylum law. I conclude the first section by examining whether longer-term concerns, such 
as the preservation of minority cultures and the ability to earn a living through better 
education, may serve as bases for complementary protection. 
The second section of this chapter analyzes the Canadian asylum law regime in light of 
the same socio-economic and cultural rights. I focus my analysis mainly on section 97 
IRPA, as well as instances of Canada accommodating refugees fleeing from natural 
disasters and other socio-economic problems. I also weave case law into my evaluation of 






5.1.Failure to Protect Socioeconomic Rights as a Basis for Asylum Claims 
5.1.1. General Considerations Regarding Socio-Economic Rights in Relation 
to Asylum 
The UDHR contains some reference to socio-economic and cultural rights
369
, but they are 
more detailed in the binding 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which entered into force in 1976, almost simultaneously with 
the ICCPR.  In Hathaway‘s opinion, the nature of the socio-economic rights recognized 
in the ICESCR prove the strength and absolute nature of the rights protected in the 
Refugee Convention as well as refugee-specific rights
370
. This is mainly due, he argues, 
to the fact that despite the non-discriminate nature of the ICESCR rights, they are only 
required to be granted in proportion to the member state‘s resources
371
. With some 
refugees being indeed present in countries with fewer economic resources, they could be 
denied many fundamental rights were it not for the existence of the Refugee Convention, 
which guarantees those rights regardless of a country‘s economic resources
372
. 
This may be a hint that the ICESCR, much like the ICCPR, may not serve as an 
independent complementary protection mechanism, but it also suggests that a violation or 
lack of fulfilment of social, economic and cultural rights may be a basis for protection. 
Such a lack of fulfilment may result from a political choice, in which case it is worth 
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asking if it amounts to persecution by the government. In other, more frequent cases, it 
may result from a state‘s inability to provide for these rights. Such a situation can 
arguably amount to persecution, just as the inability to protect from violations of basic 
civil rights is a fundamental element of refugee status determination. A third issue to 
consider with regards to socio-economic and cultural rights, is the extent to which they 
are fulfilled by the state of refuge. Where civil and political rights are more strongly tied 
to a right of non-return, socio-economic rights are often tied to settlement and the status 
granted to protection seekers
373
. Indeed, there seems to be higher recognition for the right 
to work, access to education and health care, and other rights for protected persons when 
they settle in a country of refuge, than awareness of a need to protect individuals from 
violations of those rights in their country of origin. 
Before exploring how social and economic rights may expand the protection afforded by 
the 1951 Refugee Convention, it is worth looking into the rights already contained in the 





 and liberal professions
376
 equal as that 
afforded to other aliens, as well as the same treatment as is accorded to nationals in terms 
of protection of intellectual property
377







, public relief and assistance
381
 and social security
382
. 
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Clark suggests that the reiteration of the human rights that are contained in the Refugee 
Convention within the binding covenants, such as the ICESCR, guarantees them to 
protection seekers who are outside of the refugee definition, but find themselves in a 
similar situation as refugees
383
. This contention may arguably be derived from article 5 of 
the Refugee Convention, which states that nothing in said Convention can impair rights 
and benefits accorded to refugees apart from the Convention
384
. Another author makes 
the point that denying refugees and asylum seekers those social and economic rights upon 
arrival could result in ―constructive refoulement‖
385
. Edwards writes: 
Not only might the lack of social and economic rights in a particular destination 
country threaten to deter individuals from seeking asylum from persecution there, but 
it may act as a push factor in which refugees and/or asylum-seekers, out of pure 




This serves as a strong argument for the presence of an obligation to provide for the 
social and economic rights contained in the Refugee Convention, to the same extent that 
the Convention requires, to claimants whose status has not yet been recognized. Without 
those rights, they might not be able to stay until their claim is heard and decided upon. 
Despite the clarity of an obligation on the part of the state of refuge to guarantee rights to 
individuals fleeing a risk to their life or persecution, it is unclear whether the unfulfilment 
of a socio-economic or cultural right may prompt a legitimate asylum claim under 
international law. At first glance, it appears that a situation would amount to persecution 
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if the individual were being deprived of socio-economic rights due to one of the nexus 
defined in the Refugee Convention, or faces a risk to life when the deprivation of one of 
those rights constitutes cruel treatment or punishment. 
An example of this is the right to adequate food and water that is explicitly recognized in 
the ICESCR
387
. It is arguable that events such as the great famine of 1932-1933 in 
Ukraine would have created conditions amounting to persecution, or at least conditions 
that would render refoulement to Ukraine illegal. Some groups of Ukrainians, as well as 
scholars, argue that the famine was a direct result of Stalin‘s economic policy and 
intentionally designed to eliminate ethnic Ukrainians
388
. There is some debate and 
uncertainty as to whether it fits the definition of genocide, but it is fairly clear that this 
deprivation of a basic socio-economic right was intentional and brought on by state 
policy
389
. A similar situation today, where intention is discerned behind a famine, would 
make a convincing case for a refugee claim based on the denial of an economic right. 
However, its strength would lie in the fact that it is connected to discrimination on the 
basis of ethnicity, or, at the least, to cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, which 
would make it persecution in the sense of the Refugee Convention definition or a basis 
for non-refoulement as provided for by the CAT and the ICCPR. 
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It appears, then, that one of the main contributions of the ICESCR to international asylum 
law is to widen the rights of persons who seek refuge in another state, but do not have a 
recognized status. It does so mainly through its non-discrimination provision
390
, which 
extends protection to social, economic and cultural rights to everyone regardless of status, 
without jurisdiction limitations such as those contained in the ICCPR
391
. The Human 
Rights Committee‘s comments on this provision clearly confirm this: 
The ground of nationality should not bar access to Covenant rights, e.g. all children 
within a State, including those with an undocumented status, have a right to receive 
education and access to adequate food and affordable health care. The Covenant 
rights apply to everyone including non-nationals, such as refugees, asylum-seekers, 
stateless persons, migrant workers and victims of international trafficking, regardless 
of legal status and documentation.
392
 
Further, ICESCR rights serve as interpretative tools for the concept of persecution, in the 
sense that if their denial by the state of origin is associated with one of the enumerated 
grounds in Article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention and poses a danger to an 
individual‘s life, it can amount to persecution within the realm of said definition. If 
deprivation of one of the ICESCR rights is severe enough to amount to torture or cruel 
treatment or punishment, it allows for the principle of non-refoulement to apply. 
According to UNHCR guidelines, the concept of persecution is fluid and much dependent 
on the individual context of the claim
393
. On persecution through discrimination, the 
UNHCR holds the view that individuals who benefit from less favourable treatment may 
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be considered to suffer from persecution. However, it remains mindful of the distinction 
between discrimination and persecution: 
It is only in certain circumstances that discrimination will amount to persecution. This 
would be so if measures of discrimination lead to consequences of a substantially 
prejudicial nature for the person concerned, e.g. serious restrictions on his right to 




This interpretation of discrimination as persecution opens the way to consider the 
deprivation of some socio-economic rights as part of a claim under the Refugee 
Convention. However, the ICESCR does not appear to offer an independent protection 
mechanism. It is, nonetheless, worth examining some specific situations where a socio-
economic protection need may arise and found a recognized protection claim. 
5.1.2. Lack of Protection from Natural Disasters as Persecution 
Once a rather marginal category of displaced persons, individuals fleeing from natural 
disasters are now of growing concern to the international community. In addition to 
accentuating the potential lack of protection from political persecution, natural disasters 
cause a breakdown in many states‘ ability to provide for most basic socio-economic 
rights. We know that a state‘s material inability to protect its nationals‘ and residents‘ 
civil and political rights may be sufficient to result in a right to be protected elsewhere. 
The question thus arises as to whether the concept of protection may be extended to 
situations of natural disasters, when states become unable to provide for their nationals‘ 
and residents‘ social and economic rights. 
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The primary responsibility to adequately prepare in advance for natural disasters, as well 
as to provide protection and assistance in the event of their occurrence, lies with the state 
that is exposed to such a disaster
395
. Residents and nationals have the right to request such 
protection and assistance, but if they intend to credibly claim protection from the 
international community, they have the duty to claim their country‘s protection first. Only 
if that request fails can displaced persons assert their state‘s inability to protect. This is 
confirmed by the UN Human Rights Council: 
Where the capacity and/or willingness of the authorities to fulfil their responsibilities 
is/are sufficient, the international community needs to support and supplement the 
efforts of the government and local authorities. The scope and complexity of many 
natural disasters call for the active involvement of organizations and groups, both 
within and outside the United Nations system, which possess special expertise and 




This obligation is echoed by a decision of the European Court of Human Rights, in which 
it defined the duty to protect as the obligation to take positive measures to protect from 
imminent disasters, as well as providing redress in cases where loss results from the 
negligence of local authorities
397
. Given the realization that states may be unable to 
provide for their citizens following a natural disaster, UN guidelines generally favour 
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humanitarian assistance on site, with no specific acknowledgement of natural disasters as 
a basis for an international protection claim
398
. 
The UNHCR has also considered how the depletion of natural resources due to climate 
change may result in armed conflicts and violence
399
. According to the UNHCR, such 
cases may warrant the application of the Refugee Convention as well as complementary 
international protection
400
. Another scenario induced by climate change is that of sinking 
islands due to rising sea levels, which will render many persons stateless
401
. 
Theoretically, the refugee regime was designed to protect persons who are stateless, as 
well as those who are de facto stateless due to lack of protection form their state. Hence, 
people from such sinking states clearly would require some form of protection under 
international law. This protection has been called for by the UNHCR, but no clear 
international protection scheme has been designed as of yet. 
The most obvious scenario and the main concern in this subsection is that of a sudden and 
highly destructive natural disaster, like the Haiti earthquake in January 2010, or the 2004 
Indian Ocean tsunami. The UNHCR recognizes that individuals fleeing from such natural 
disasters lack one of the criteria defined in the Refugee Convention, which is persecution 
related to one of the five enumerated grounds in Article 1(A)(2)
402
. In order to fill this 
legal vacuum, the UNHCR has mandated itself with a Cluster Approach. This involves 
the joint participation of NGOs in a relief effort on a case-by-case basis, and, as 
mentioned in chapter 2, has been helpful in assisting large numbers of displaced 
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. However, natural disasters would probably be easier to face if states 
acknowledged an obligation to grant refuge or designed a framework that allows for a 
more predictable and rapid response. 
Currently, the only international legal instrument that provides protection to individuals 
crossing borders because of a breakdown of socio-economic rights following a natural 
disaster is the OAU Convention
404
. In article I(2), this convention defines a refugee as a 
person ―compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in 
another place outside his country of origin or nationality because of events seriously 
disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality‖. 
This definition would include armed conflicts caused by the effects of climate change on 
the availability of resources
405
. Also, the meaning of ―events seriously disturbing public 
order‖ may be reasonably interpreted as including natural disasters, as there is no further 
requirement that the ―events‖ should be directly caused by human activity
406
.  
The UNHCR thus shows strong recognition of the need to extend protection to victims of 
natural disasters and to develop a better means of protection of ICESCR rights in the 
refugee context, but Canada has no obligation to provide such protection at the moment. 
Although an ideal solution for victims of natural disasters would be to add only a 
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provision that covers natural disasters within the 1951 Refugee Convention, the UNHCR 
acknowledges that it is unrealistic, as it would open up a debate about the entire 
international refugee protection system and, in light of the current political context, might 
result in a restriction of the refugee definition
407
. At best, the OAU Convention serves as 
an example that states outside of Africa may follow through their own legislation. 
5.1.3. Lack of Adequate Health Care as Persecution 
The right to the highest attainable standard of health
408
 is a complex right, which is 
essential to the enjoyment of several other human rights, both civil and political, as well 
as social and economic. It indeed affects fundamental civil rights such as the right to 
life
409





, and stems from important socio-economic rights such as the 
right to food, water, clothing and adequate housing
412
, the right to social insurance and 
social security
413
, and even the right to education
414
. Consistent with this intertwinement, 
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the definition of health in article 12 ICESCR goes beyond health care by imposing 
preventive and general public health measures, such as environmental and industrial 
hygiene. Given its range, it is no surprise that the right to health comes into play in 
different aspects of international refugee law. 
No state can realistically be expected to guarantee a right to be healthy, but the right to 
health comprises specific freedoms and entitlements
415
. According to the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights‘ interpretation, Article 12 ICESCR provides the 
entitlement to a health care system, which everyone may equally access, while 
guaranteeing the individual freedom to control one‘s body, which includes sexual and 
reproductive freedom
416
. In conjunction with the absolute non-discrimination provision in 
article 2(2), this means that everyone, including refugees and other protection seekers, 
should benefit from those rights. This interpretation has been partially confirmed in a 
UNHCR study of complementary protection
417
. 
[Individuals] who have been granted protection from removal are entitled to basic 
human rights […]. Children of such persons are guaranteed access to free primary 
education. In addition, all beneficiaries of protection from removal have the right to 
the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, as well as an adequate 
standard of living (i.e. shelter, food and clothing).
418
 
This interpretation is limited to individuals who are granted protection from removal, 
which links the rights to a status. These rights should actually be guaranteed to persons 
whose removal or status determination is pending as well, in order to avoid ―constructive 
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refoulement‖, that is, the idea that protection seekers might be forced to return to a 
country where they risk persecution because of inadequate conditions upon arrival to the 
country of refuge. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this thesis, it means that Canada has 
the obligation to guarantee an appropriate standard of health to all individuals to whom it 
grants refuge, regardless of the status attached to protection. 
Meanwhile the concept of  ―highest attainable standard of health‖ may be translated as 
―the highest attainable standard of health possible given the state‘s resources and 
biological predispositions and personal choices of the individual‖
419
. The fulfilment of 
the right to health may thus be perceived as a balancing act. The general unavailability of 
appropriate health care facilities would thus not be recognized in international law as a 
ground for protection of individuals from states where such availability is 
disproportionately lower than the states‘ resources. Nor is there such protection when the 
quality, restrictions based on ethical or moral considerations or physical accessibility of 
health care is inadequate in light of the available resources.  
It appears, at this point in time, that international protection for individuals who do not 
benefit from adequate health care only applies when their situation fits into the Refugee 
Convention definition. The only aspect of the right to health that is consistent with those 
requirements is that health services be offered in a non-discriminatory way. For instance, 
individuals who are infected with HIV and are denied treatment, because of the prejudice 
associated with the condition and, despite the state having sufficient resources to provide 
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it, may qualify as refugees who are persecuted by reason of belonging to a social 
group
420
. This is true if we apply the UNHCR‘s definition of social group. 
A particular social group is a group of persons who share a common characteristic 
other than their risk of being persecuted, or who are perceived as a group by society. 
The characteristic will often be one which is innate, unchangeable, or which is 




My analysis of Canadian case law in subsection 5.2.3 will determine how Canadian 
authorities perceive persecution based on denial of health care. 
5.1.4. Incidence of Cultural Rights in Asylum Claims 
A final example of a pivotal right guaranteed by the ICESCR is the right of communities 
to realize their cultural development, mainly through education. The right to education is 
defined in article 13 ICESCR
422
, which is linked to the right to freely pursue economic, 
social and cultural development in article 1(1) ICESCR
423
. These rights essentially open 
up awareness to and respect of most civil and political rights, as well as the right to 
benefit from social, economic and cultural development. As such, withholding people‘s 
right to education may be perceived as persecution, and becomes yet another interesting 
question regarding asylum law.  
                                                 
420
 UN Joint Programme on HIV/AIDS, Strategies to Support the HIV-Related Needs of Refugees and Host 
Populations, October 2005, UNAIDS/05.21E, online: UNHCR Refworld  <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/ 
docid/438b21d64.htm>. 
421
 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection No. 2: "Membership of a 
Particular Social Group" Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, UNHCR, UN Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02 (2002) ¶ 11. 
422
 Article 13 ICESR: ―1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to 
education. They agree that education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and 
the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. They 
further agree that education shall enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society, promote 
understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups, and 
further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.‖  
423
 Article 1(1) ICESCR: ―All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.‖ 
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The obligation to provide education to everyone, including persons benefiting from 
asylum, becomes clear given my previous analysis of other socio-economic rights. 
However, it is not entirely clear whether the withdrawal of this right for a targeted group 
amounts to persecution. Following the interpretation of persecution through 
discrimination offered by the UNHCR
424
, depriving a group of people of the right to 
education might amount to persecution.  
The Roma of Eastern and Central Europe could be cited as an example of such 
persecution, as their access to education is limited in comparison with the majority ethnic 
groups in countries such as Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria
425
. Despite the interpretation 
that this amounts to persecution under the Refugee Convention, most European countries 
reportedly have routinely refused refugee claims from Roma people based on both 
discrimination and poor education, as well as violent attacks and vandalism
426
. Scholars 
who study this issue seem to imply that many countries in which Roma make asylum 
claims misunderstand their situation and discriminate against them through the rejection 
of their claims
427
, which seems plausible to me. It is also worth noting that the Roma can 
present an example of persecution based on other socio-economic rights, as they ―have 
much lower life expectancies, lower literacy rates, and a lower standard of living than the 
general populace and often are relegated to appalling living conditions‖
428
. Much of these 
conditions are arguably caused by rampant discrimination and inadequacy of state 
                                                 
424
 UNHCR Handbook, supra note 393 ¶ 51-53. 
425
 See generally Istvan Pogany, ―Minority Rights and the Roma of Central and Eastern Europe‖ (2006) 6 
Human Rights Law Review 1. 
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policies towards the Roma, and they have the effect of thwarting Romani communities‘ 
growth and threatening the preservation of their culture. 
The foregoing observations on different socio-economic rights serve as an indication that 
protection obligations, as outlined in the Refugee Convention, provide clear rights for 
recognized refugees and protected persons upon settlement. Violations or deprivations of 
socio-economic rights may also be considered under the refugee definition. However, 
there is currently no customary or treaty law providing clear protection to individuals 
who seek protection from denial of education and cultural development, but ethnic 
minority struggles serve as an indication that such obligations should be clarified, and 
means of protection extended. 
5.2.Implementation of Socio-Economic Rights in Canadian Asylum Law 
5.2.1. The Obligation to Provide for Claimants’ Socio-Economic Rights 
Canadian immigration and refugee protection legislation and regulations provide several 
references to social and economic rights. They generally conform to Canada‘s clearer 
Refugee Convention obligations, but present an interpretative challenge where 
international obligations are not quite set in stone. From the previous section, I have 
identified the obligation of countries of refuge to provide adequate health care, the right 
to work, and the right to benefit from social security and education for children that are 
equal to the rights afforded to their nationals. This is clear in the Refugee Convention, 
and strengthened by the wide scope of the ICESCR. 
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As a response to this right, refugee claimants and other protection claimants are granted a 
permanent resident visa
429
, which allows them to apply for employment authorization, to 
receive social security, or to apply for student authorization. This in turn allows such 
persons to have access to housing, clothing, food and water. Canada generally fulfils 
these obligations regarding individuals recognized as refugees, and towards claimants 
who are awaiting status determination. 
As for considerations related to health care, foreign nationals are deemed inadmissible if 
they are afflicted with a health condition that is likely to be a danger to public health, to 
public safety, or might cause excessive demand
430
 on health or social services, based on 
section 38 IRPA
431
. Currently, the regulations provide an exception to the excessive 
demand exclusion for refugees and protection seekers, which means they all have access 
to health care while their claim is pending and they will not be excluded on these 
grounds
432
. However, the exception does not cover protection seekers who might cause a 
risk to public safety or public health, for instance those who present with a highly 
contagious disease that may cause a risk of epidemic
433
. It seems that just as the 
obligation to provide protection cannot be avoided by restricting territorial access, the 
                                                 
429
 Section 39 IRPA Regulations, based on section 32 IRPA. 
430
 Section 1(1) IRPA Regulations. : ― […] ―excessive demand‖ means (a) a demand on health services or 
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(b) is likely to be a danger to public safety; or 
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432
 Section 139(4) IRPA Regulations: ―A foreign national who is a member of a class prescribed by this 
Division, and meets the applicable requirements of this Division, is exempted from the application of 
paragraph 38(1)(c) of the Act.‖ 
433
 Section 38(1)(a) and (b) IRPA. 
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obligation to provide health care to protection seekers should be extended to prevent such 
restrictions on territorial access. States of refuge such as Canada have the appropriate 
health care facilities to provide services to individuals who fear for their life while 
avoiding a national epidemic. Recognizing this would avoid turning protection claimants 
away due to a medical condition. 
5.2.2. Protection from Natural Disasters 
The IRPA and its affiliated regulations make no direct mention of situations of natural 
disasters, but they present two apparent windows of opportunity for persons seeking 
refuge from such situations. The first one is to seek a decision of the Minister based on 
humanitarian or compassionate grounds, in order to waive the usual requirements of the 
IRPA
434
. The second is the possibility to interpret the provisions regarding humanitarian-
protected persons abroad
435
 in a wide-ranging manner. These provisions were designed to 
expand the meaning of ―person in similar circumstances‖ in subsection 12(3) IRPA
436
. 
This subsection is part of the section relating to classes of foreign nationals who may be 
selected as permanent residents. It thus includes refugees who make inland claims, and 
also allows for assistance to persons outside of Canada who find themselves in a situation 
                                                 
434
 Section 25(1) IRPA: ―The Minister shall, upon request of a foreign national in Canada who is 
inadmissible or who does not meet the requirements of this Act, and may, on the Minister‘s own initiative 
or on request of a foreign national outside Canada, examine the circumstances concerning the foreign 
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affected, or by public policy considerations.‖; Sub-section 95(1)(c): ―Refugee protection is conferred on a 
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application for protection.‖ 
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 Section 146 IRPA Regulations. 
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 Subsection 12(3) IRPA: ―A foreign national, inside or outside Canada, may be selected as a person who 
under this Act is a Convention refugee or as a person in similar circumstances, taking into account 
Canada‘s humanitarian tradition with respect to the displaced and the persecuted.‖ 
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that does not satisfy all the requirements of the Refugee Convention definition, but are 
nevertheless considered as deserving protection. 
The regulations express what is meant by ―similar circumstances‖ in Canadian 
legislation. Humanitarian-protected persons may be members of the country of asylum 
class
437
, or members of the source country class
438
. None of these provisions include 
humanitarian tragedies caused by natural disasters, as they are meant to extend protection 
to individuals affected by civil war, or persons from countries where civil and political 
rights are systematically violated
439
. Given the wording of this provision, it is more likely 
to apply when civil and political unrest come about as a result of devastation by a natural 
disaster. 
The Canadian Minister of Citizenship and Immigration has, nonetheless, issued certain 
guidelines regarding situations where natural disasters occur. There is no special program 
designed to grant refuge to such persons, but applicants for all immigration or refugee 
classes may have their claims processed in an expedited manner when they are rendered 
more vulnerable by such an event
440
. 
In a review of the case law regarding international protection, the Immigration and 
Refugee Board confirms that no interpretation of international refugee law allows for the 
                                                 
437
 Section 147 IRPA Regulations: ―A foreign national is a member of the country of asylum class if they 
have been determined by an officer to be in need of resettlement because 
(a) they are outside all of their countries of nationality and habitual residence; and 
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 Section 148 IRPA Regulations. 
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 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Operational Bulletin OB-083, ―Guidelines for Priority Processing 
in the Event of Disaster Situations‖ (October 30, 2008). 
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inclusion of victims of natural disasters or climate change
441
. They reach this conclusion 
by stating that inability to protect alone would not be sufficient to allow for a claim to be 
accepted, as persecution is also required. They base this on the Ward case
442
: 
The need for ―persecution‖ in order to warrant international protection, for example, 
results in the exclusion of such pleas as those of economic migrants, i.e., individuals 
in search of better living conditions, and those of victims of natural disasters, even 
when the home state is unable to provide assistance, although both of these cases 
might seem deserving of international sanctuary.
443
 
This analysis rightfully underlines the importance of the requirement that persecution 
occurs. However, there is a difference between persons seeking a higher standard of 
living, and those who face a serious and immediate risk to their life due to a natural 
disaster. The Court could have been more flexible in their application of this requirement 
in the latter case, given that migration is not entirely done by choice. 
It appears then, that despite a compliance with clearly defined international obligations 
derived from multilateral treaties, Canada is not willing to go beyond these obligations by 
following norms and general recommendations of the UNHCR or other UN bodies. 
5.2.3. Protection from Unwillingness or Inability to Provide Health Care 
In addition to exceptions relating to health care in the determination of admissibility at 
the frontier, section 97 IRPA, which recognizes persons in need of protection, contains an 
explicit exclusion of claims relating to the inability to provide health care. 
                                                 
441
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A person in need of protection is a person in Canada whose removal to their country 
or countries of nationality or, if they do not have a country of nationality, their 
country of former habitual residence, would subject them personally […] to a risk to 
their life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment if […] the risk is 




I have previously demonstrated that such an exception would not be inconsistent with 
Canada‘s international obligations. However, the language of this subsection, in a way, 
supports my argument that an obligation to protect persons who need health services that 
are disproportionately inaccessible could be legitimate under international law. In this 
section of IRPA, the Canadian government recognizes an obligation to protect individuals 
from a risk to life that can be avoided by granting refuge. In the same breath, this section 
excludes a risk to life related to inadequate health care. Had it not specified that 
exclusion, the case law could have included it by interpreting the general objective of this 
provision. 
This exception only identifies inability to provide adequate health care, which suggests 
that a state‘s unwillingness to provide health care would be a basis for protection in 
Canadian law. I have mentioned the hypothetical example of individuals who are HIV 
positive in the previous section as situations where a state may be unwilling to provide 
health care due to membership in a particular social group. Such cases have been recently 
examined by the Federal Court in the A.B. case
445
.  
Under the refugee claim analysis, the IRB had deemed the claimants, HIV positive 
persons from Zimbabwe, part of a social group. However, the IRB found that their 
                                                 
444
 Subsection 97(1)(b)(iv) IRPA. 
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 A.B. and others v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 444, [2007] 1 F.C.R. 505. 
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allegations of stigmatization and thus persecution were too speculative
446
. The IRB‘s 
conclusions on the country conditions acknowledge the instability of Zimbabwe as a 
factor in limiting the country‘s resources, but they observe that health care is available to 
all, and that it should not be evaluated according to Canadian standards or judged on its 
shortcomings
447
. The IRB also analyzed the case in light of whether the claimants were 
persons in need of protection pursuant to section 97 IRPA. They concluded that the 
claimants did not face a risk of torture or cruel and unusual treatment, and that health care 
in Zimbabwe is equally accessible to all
448
. The Board only considered section 25 IRPA, 




The Federal Court reviewed the Board‘s analysis of section 97 IRPA. In their opinion, 
―the correct approach to the application of section 97 of the IRPA in a context like this 
one is to first decide if there is sufficient evidence to establish that an applicant‘s life 
would be at risk and then to determine if the health care exclusion applies‖
450
. Relying on 




 cases, and an analysis of the evidence 
presented by the claimants, the Court concluded that they did not qualify for protection 
under 97 IRPA, due to inadequate evidence. Nevertheless, their interpretation of section 
                                                 
446
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450
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451
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186. 
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 Singh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 288, [2004] 3 F.C.R. 323, 39 Imm. 
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97 IRPA allows protection for individuals who are denied health care in a discriminatory 
fashion. This conclusion is based on the words within the legislation. The Court states: 
I am not satisfied that the section 97(1)(b)(iv) exclusion is so wide that it would 
preclude from consideration all situations involving a person‘s inability to access 
health care in his country of origin. […] Parliament has frequently used the phrase 
―unable or unwilling‖ in the IRPA (see sections 96, 97, and 39).  [The] failure to use 
―unwilling‖ in section 97(1)(b)(iv) was quite deliberate and was intended to narrow 
the scope of that exclusion.  [It] would take very little adjustment to the language of 
the exclusion to make it beyond doubt that it was intended to cover every situation of 
risk to life on health grounds.
453
 
They further strengthen this interpretation by fitting it into an analysis of international 
human rights and the purpose of international protection. 
[The] Federal Court of Appeal decision in De Guzman v. Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration) […]
454
 clearly endorses an approach to the 
interpretation of the language of the IRPA to achieve, where possible, harmony with 
Canada‘s obligations under international human rights instruments.  As an example, 
[…] the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights […] 
requires states‘ parties to use their maximum of available resources for the realization 
of the right to health.  […] Canada should extend refugee protection to claimants who 
would otherwise be returned to places where their governments are in deliberate non-




It seems then, that if a claimant who requests protection through section 97 IRPA 
manages to establish, with corroborating evidence, that they are being denied health care 
as a means of discrimination, they may thus obtain refuge in Canada. 
                                                 
453
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5.2.4. Protection from Unwillingness or Inability to Provide Education 
Where discrimination in education is considered, Canadian law reflects the general 
evasiveness of international human rights law on the subject, and the lack of recognition 
in international protection for longer term concerns such as the preservation of a minority 
culture, and equal prospects of earning a livelihood. 
Discrimination through education is still commonly mentioned in cases where other types 
of persecution and discrimination are considered, including in protection claims made by 
Roma of Eastern and Central Europe, who exemplify this concern. Many of the Roma 
cases involve claimants who have been unnecessarily and arbitrarily placed in schools for 
children with special needs, or fear that their children will not have access to the same 
level of education as the majority of children in the same countries because of rampant 
discrimination from educators
456
. Although the differential treatment is based on the 
claimants‘ ethnicity, education concerns alone are not sufficient to found a protection 




One instance where the right to education was more seriously considered by the Federal 
Court was a case where a Romani couple had a Canadian-born child who would be 
seriously disadvantaged if the family were returned to Romania
458
. The Court recognized 
the following problems faced by Romani children, including several ways in which they 
are disadvantaged in education: 
                                                 
456
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Roma children often experience discrimination and exclusion when accessing state 
education. Some reports detail overt discrimination, such as teachers only providing 
help to non-Roma children, through to reports of violence and abuse directed at Roma 
children. Several sources noted that lack of education was a serious problem among 
Roma in Romania. Roma children are 25 per cent less likely to attend elementary 
school and 30 per cent likely [sic] to attend secondary school. Children are among 
those who are directly affected by human rights abuses in Romania. […] The lack of 
economic and social opportunities in Romanian society has subjected Roma children 
to various vulnerabilities. In some circumstances, they are forced to work to earn a 
living. While the law prohibits forced or compulsory child labor, such practices 
remain widespread in Romani communities. Many children were reported to 
occasionally forego attending school while working on family farms, especially in 
rural areas and in Romani communities. 3.9 million of the 5.6 million children in the 
country were "economically active". Over 300 thousand (approximately 7 percent) 
were "child laborers‖[…] Child labor, including begging, selling trinkets on the 
street, or washing windshields, remained widespread in Romani communities; 
children engaged in such activities could be as young as five years old.
459
 
In that case, the Court deemed the best interests of the child in relation to education, as 
well as the social and economic setting that leads to lack of education, as the determining 
factors of the case, and that the previously cited conditions were not properly taken into 
consideration. The court thus considered the Visa Officer‘s decision to be manifestly 
unreasonable and referred it to redetermination by another Visa Officer. However, it 
remains a rare occurrence and most cases need more elements of persecution for 
protection to be granted. 
From this, it appears that the social, economic and cultural rights contained in the 
ICESCR do not create a basis for protection in themselves, but they may guide the 
                                                 
459
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interpretation of the Refugee Convention and alternative protection mechanisms that exist 
in states. As such, protection claims where it is alleged that these rights are unfulfilled 
may be granted, when the unfulfilment of ICESR rights corresponds with criteria in 
existing protection schemes. However, claims based on rights that are significant in the 
long term tend to be associated with the search for a higher standard of living and are, 
thus, usually rejected.  
From these chapters dealing with how human rights can be invoked to expand protection, 
the following chapter looks into how considerations regarding the claimant‘s identity 
affect the application of protection mechanisms. 
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Chapter 6. Obligations Related to Groups not Explicitly Accounted for by the 
Refugee Definition 
My discussion has so far centred around the types of protection that are generally 
applicable to everyone, regardless of other considerations such as age, gender or family 
ties. This chapter deals with how these three considerations affect the interpretation of 
international law and human rights, and how they may widen the scope of international 
protection for specific groups of people. It is also concerned with specific rules that have 
a positive discrimination effect and account for the needs of groups who may be more 
vulnerable, such as children and women. I also deal with the specific value of the 
preservation of family ties, which affects the interpretation and application of 
international protection laws. 
This chapter is divided according to the different concerns or groups I have identified, 
starting with the importance of the preservation of family ties, the best interests of the 
child, and finally, touching upon the awareness of types of persecution that are more 
detrimental to women and the protection that is granted accordingly. Each section 
contains an overview of the protection offered by international law, followed by an 
analysis of Canadian law and policy regarding the same topic. 
6.1.Concern with Family Ties and Family Unity 
Respect for family life is an important factor in the interpretation of alien rights in the 
ICCPR. Along with the prohibition of torture and cruel, unusual or inhuman treatment or 
punishment and non-discrimination, it is one of the factors which trigger an exception to 
the state‘s ability to determine who enters its territory
460
. In light of the foregoing, it 
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becomes relevant to look into the way family ties may be used to extend protection to 
persons who would otherwise be excluded. 
The ICCPR generally recognizes family as ―the natural and fundamental group unit of 
society‖ that is ―entitled to protection by the society and State‖
461
. Article 23 of ICCPR 
further recognizes the right to wilfully marry and found a family
462
. The concept of 
family is to be broadly interpreted as it is understood in the country concerned
463
. In 
addition to the obligation to protect family integrity through legislation, states have the 
obligation not to interfere with it
464
.  
This recognition of the importance of the family unit suggests that persons who are 
granted protection by an asylum state should see the same protection afforded to their 
family in order to preserve its integrity. It also creates awareness that persecution may 
have repercussions on an entire family, and not just on the individual who faces it 
directly. This is reflected by the Human Rights Committee‘s comments on the protection 
of the family: 
                                                                                                                                                 
Covenant does not recognize the right of aliens to enter or reside in the territory of a State party.  It is in 
principle a matter for the State to decide who it will admit to its territory.  However, in certain 
circumstances an alien may enjoy the protection of the Covenant even in relation to entry or residence, for 
example, when considerations of non-discrimination, prohibition of inhuman treatment and respect for 
family life arise.‖ 
461
 Article 23(1) ICCPR. 
462
 Article 23(2), (3) and (4): ―The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a 
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3. No marriage shall be entered into without the free and full consent of the intending spouses.  
4. States Parties to the present Covenant shall take appropriate steps to ensure equality of rights and 
responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. In the case of dissolution, 
provision shall be made for the necessary protection of any children.‖ 
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[The] possibility to live together implies the adoption of appropriate measures, both at 
the internal level and as the case may be, in cooperation with other States, to ensure 
the unity or reunification of families, particularly when their members are separated 
for political, economic or similar reasons.
465
 
Apart from the Refugee Convention provision that nothing in the latter can impair other 
rights granted to refugees
466
, the Conference of Plenipotentiaries that adopted the 
Convention itself issued a recommendation affirming refugees‘ right to family unity
467
. 
However, the right to family unity is not as widely recognized as the right not to be 
subjected to torture, and States tend to shape its scope according to the best interests of 
the child, the state‘s right to make decisions on entry or stay of non-nationals and the 
nature of the family ties involved
468
. The factor that strengthens it most remains the 
imperative obligation to act in the best interest of the child
469
, which will be discussed at 
greater length in the following section. 
Based on the foregoing international affirmations of the importance of family unity, it is 
conceivable that persecution under the Refugee Convention can comprise of interference 
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 Kate Jastram & Kathleen Newland, ―Family Unity and Refugee Protection‖ in Feller, Turk & 





with family life by reason of one of the five enumerated grounds, and that if the state fails 
or refuses to fulfil this right, it ought to be a basis for a refugee claim under section 96 of 
IRPA. Conversely, where a risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment is concerned, it may be demonstrated as a risk to the entire family and should 
warrant the protection of section 97 of IRPA. It may also be demonstrated through threats 
targeting the family or the persons who provide for the rest of the family. My analysis of 
Canadian case law and policy will reveal that such an interpretation has not been applied. 
Furthermore, families may require protection based on the risk faced by one of their 
members. However, family unity does not overcome the possibility of exclusions based 
on serious criminality under article 1(F) of the Refugee Convention, or section 98 of 
IRPA in the Canadian context. If one member faces exclusion, family members may 
demonstrate that they, nonetheless, deserve refugee or protected person status, and they 
may demonstrate that they face a greater risk due to the excludable act of their family 
member
470
. In reality, members of an excluded claimant‘s family need to make a difficult 
choice between facing a risk of persecution and breaking family unity. In light of this, 
Feller and others call for a very strict interpretation of the exclusion clauses in Canada, in 
order to avoid breaking families apart for crimes that do not warrant exclusion
471
. 
Furthermore, in cases of deportation such as Chiarelli
472
, the constitutional analysis of the 
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validity of deportation orders does not take into account principles such as family unity, 
something Bassan deplores in her analysis of the case. She writes:  
The Chiarelli position sanctions the fundamental importance of the State‘s power to 
expel while seemingly ignoring the alien‘s competing interests. In order to extend 
constitutional protections to permanent residents facing deportation from Canada, it is 
incumbent upon the courts to adequately consider the interests of the individual, 
whose ties with the State are through home, family and society.
473
 
In deportation cases, the best interests of the child, if their separation from a parent would 
cause undue hardship, are likely to have a higher impact in the weighing of competing 
rights than mere family unity. I will examine such cases in the following section. 
In Canada, the right to family unity has been mentioned in the case law as part of the 
concept of ―indirect persecution‖
474
. It was defined and applied in the Bhatti case in these 
terms: 
The theory is based on a recognition of the broader harm caused by persecutory acts. 
By recognizing that family members of persecuted persons may themselves be 
victims of persecution, the theory allows the granting of status to those who might 
otherwise be unable to individually prove a well-founded fear of persecution.
475
 
This decision included the psychological stress and trauma related to a family member 
being persecuted, but also went as far as considering the adverse effects of persecution on 
family members‘ social and economic rights through impeding the head of the family‘s 
ability to earn a livelihood
476
. 
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The Federal Court reined in this expansion in the interpretation of the Refugee 
Convention definition in subsequent decisions. Rothstein J. considered, in the Pour-
Shariati case
477
, that the concept of indirect persecution had been too broadly defined in 
the name of family unity. 
 The concept of ―indirect persecution‖ in Bhatti is defined in very broad terms. It can 
encompass situations ranging from a person witnessing the ill-treatment of loved ones 
to the experience of a person who is obliged to stay in his or her country of origin, 
without the economic and social support of a certain family member. It is suggested 
that the principle of family unity justifies the indirect persecution concept.
478
 
Rothstein J. states that such a broad concept is irreconcilable with the Convention refugee 
definition and unjustifiably broadens it
479
. 
The idea of indirect persecution supported by the importance of family unity was later 
excluded altogether from the refugee definition in Casetellantos
480
, which has been 
confirmed in the more recent Sivamoorthy
481
 case. Similar to the Supreme Court‘s 
analysis of distress caused by natural disasters
482
, the Casetellanos case made no 
distinctions between psychological and physical trauma caused by the persecution of a 
family member because of one of the five Convention grounds, and the way such 
persecution affects the family‘s ability to earn a livelihood or maintain a certain standard 
of living. Also, the IRB states that claims based solely on family unity, defined by the 
UNHCR
483
 as cases where the immediate family members of a claimant who fits the 
refugee definition may be granted protection regardless of their own risk of persecution 
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on the sole basis of the principle of family unity, are not recognised in Canadian law
484
. 
The IRB thus confirms the reversal in the case law, altogether rejecting indirect 
persecution founded on family ties as a basis for the application of the Refugee 
Convention definition. 
Despite the protection provisions being interpreted in a limited way, a claimant who is 
recognized as a protected person may apply for permanent residence along with their 
family members, even if they are abroad. An individual who is recognized as a protected 
person has 180 days to apply for permanent residence
485
, and they may include family 
members in this application
486
. Family members may only obtain permanent residence 
after the protected person has paid the processing fees
487
, obtained their own permanent 
resident status and demonstrated that their family members are indeed related in the way 
they claim to be
488
. The claim is then processed through the Canadian visa office abroad.  
Hence, despite the limited interpretation of the Refugee Convention and of persons in 
need of protection provisions being focused on the individual and not the family, an 
individual who is granted protection may be reunited with his or her family. However, 
this reunification process has been the subject of criticism due to processing delays, as it 
takes several months to gather the processing fees, and then several more months to 
process the applications
489
. Added to the time a claimant is separated from their family 
while their protection claim is being processed, this can add up to at least 2 years of 
separation and seriously challenge the integrity of family relationships. 
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From the abovementioned observations, it appears that in Canadian law, family unity 
itself is insufficient to extend the parameters of protection contained in the Refugee 
Convention, an interpretation that is inconsistent with the UNHCR‘s inclusion of family 
unity as a basis for extended protection. However, it is possible that family unity is given 
weight when tied to another, more clearly and generally accepted factor, such as the best 
interest of the child or women‘s rights. The former will be the subject of the next section. 
6.2.The Importance of the Best Interests of the Child 
From a legal point of view, children have a clearly defined status as minors
490
, which 
triggers a higher responsibility and duties on the part of the family and the state. It is, 
therefore, hardly surprising that provisions directly target them in both international and 
domestic law. In the ICCPR, article 23 on the protection of family unity is directly 
followed by an article guaranteeing the protection of the child without discrimination
491
. 
The HRC states that all civil and political rights should be guaranteed to children, as well 
as the rights they benefit from as minors
492
. The protection of children‘s rights benefits 
from a near-universal ratification, with only two signatory countries not having ratified 
the 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child
493
. Signatory states are, nonetheless, 
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In international law, and under the Canadian interpretation of it, protection related to 
some civil and political rights is more easily triggered where minors are concerned
495
. 
One of those rights is the inherent right to life and the prohibition of torture. Those rights 
have been recognized in the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which guarantees and 
extends them by prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty or imprisonment without 
possibility of liberation on children under 18
496
. The Canadian Immigration and Refugee 
Board has declared that it recognizes an inherent difference when a certain type of 
treatment is inflicted on a child or on an adult, based on the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child and the comments of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child
497
. The IRB 
states: ―Although the same definition of torture applies to both adults and to children, its 
application should take into account the particular situation of children, as recognized in 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child‖
498
. The UN Committee on the Rights of the 
Child‘s recommendations describe the extent of the protection required for children 
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within the realm of discipline, detention and punishment which, if they surpass the 
threshold outlined or fail to fulfil the obligations outlined by the Committee, become a 
basis for protection against cruel, unusual or degrading treatment
499
. 
The rights of the child with regards to cruel treatment have been considered by the 
Federal Court in the Hashmat case
500
, which centred around whether a family could 
relocate to another part of Afghanistan to avoid the risk of persecution. This possibility, 
termed Internal Flight Alternative (IFA), forms part of the assessment of the inability or 
unwillingness to protect on the part of the home country. If claimants may avoid 
persecution by moving to a different region of their country of origin, they are denied 
refugee status. In this case, however, the high risk of violence being inflicted on the 
children on the journey to the possible IFA excluded it as a viable option. The same goes 
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The IRB has also directly applied the standards against violence inflicted on children. For 
example, they did so in Decision VA0-02635
502
, concerning a Chinese adolescent who 
had been beaten into submission by his father and forced to come to Canada to earn 
money for his family. 
[In] the panel's view, the cruel and degrading punishment which the claimant received 
cannot be justified under rubrics like "filial piety" and "patrilineal authority."  The 
States parties to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child took a stand against 
violence towards children, and by doing so clearly held that the international 
community should not tolerate certain patterns of behaviour, whether or not they are 
culturally-specific.  Using children as soldiers, selling them into prostitution, and 
beating them into submission are all acts enjoined by the Convention, wrong 
wherever they are practiced, in China or in Canada.  Thus, when "filial piety" and 
"patrilineal authority" result in the psychological disabling of a child's normal 
functioning, "cultural" values must take a back seat to the child's best interests.  It is 
persecution to be beaten in this cruel and systematic way, whatever arguments we 
advance to justify it.
503
 
The same view has been upheld in another case of parental abuse, allowing an individual 
claim by a child to be accepted
504
. In both cases, the children were being illegally 
trafficked, and would be inevitably ―re-trafficked‖ if returned. The IRB also concluded 
that despite the existence of child protection laws in China, the cultural importance of the 
father as the head of the family usually prevails and the laws are rarely enforced. The 
lack of fulfilment of a child‘s basic economic and social rights, which are generally 
provided to other children in the same country of origin, has also been accepted by courts 
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as persecution. Indeed, ―A child who would experience hardships including deprivation 
of medical care, education opportunities, employment opportunities and food would 
suffer concerted and severe discrimination, amounting to persecution‖
505
. 
More pivotal in the interpretation of protection measures in Canadian law is the principle 
of the best interests of the child. Article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
requires courts of law to treat it as a primary consideration, without distinction as to the 
area of law concerned
506
. As such, it is an important part of asylum and refugee 
protection, in terms of procedural matters and treatment of asylum seekers, as well as the 
status determination on its merits
507
. It is also tied to the principle of family unity, which 
is defined in the Convention on the Rights of the Child as part of a child‘s fundamental 
rights. 
This principle‘s general acceptance is hampered by its wide net of protection and the 
issue of indeterminacy that accompanies it. Indeed, it might be very far reaching and 
connected to a great variety of rights, but it also may be considered as vague
508
. For 
example, genital mutilation may be considered in many states as being in the best interest 
of the child in some cultures because of its significance in the child‘s social development 
and their membership in a community, whereas in other states, the violence of the 
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practice sets it against a child‘s best interests
509
. In Canadian cases, the practice has been 
considered as amounting to persecution and thus against the best interests of the child
510
, 
which suggests that Canada interprets violence as a more important factor than social 
norms in the consideration of those interests. 
The best interests of the child are given varying weight in status determination, or in the 
evaluation of deportation orders in different countries
511
, but the courts in Canada 
attribute a substantial weight to the principle
512
. Although family unity on its own does 
not have a major impact on deportation cases, the Supreme Court‘s analysis in Baker
513
 
has led to a different conclusion when the best interests of children come into play. 
This case was concerned with a woman who applied for an exemption from her 
deportation order based on humanitarian and compassionate grounds, under section 
114(2) of the Immigration Act
514
. One of the reasons she submitted for her exemption 
was the negative effect her deportation might have on her children. L‘Heureux-Dubé J. 
recognized that the Convention on the Rights of the Child was not implemented into 
Canadian law, and thus did not have a direct application in domestic law, but, she argued, 
its fundamental principles ought not to be undermined through the application and 
interpretation of domestic law
515
. In that case, the principle at hand was the best interests 
of the child, and this case consecrated its important weight in deportation decisions. The 
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principle has since been integrated directly into section 25(1) of IRPA. This provision 
deals with ministerial discretion based on humanitarian and compassionate grounds, both 
in cases of admission and deportation, and requires the Minister to consider the best 
interest of the child when evaluating such requests
516
. 
The reasoning in this landmark case is consistent with the guidelines of the IRB, which 
require the analysis of the best interest of the child as a primary consideration in all 
claims involving child refugee claimants
517
. Nonetheless, the endorsement of the 
principle by the Supreme Court led to a consistent consideration of the best interests of 
the child in asylum or deportation cases. One such case is Patel
518
, where the Federal 
Court justifies the application of the best interests of the child to a protection claim. 
The applicant submits that humanitarian and compassionate considerations have no 
place in the determination of whether or not a claimant is a Convention refugee or a 
person in need of protection. And that the Board is required to make a determination 
on the basis of the factors set out in sections 96 and 97 of the Act. Any humanitarian 
and compassionate factors raised by a particular claimant, such as the best interest of 
the child, can only be fully considered once a determination is made on the issue 
whether a claimant merits protection in Canada.  However, the words ―humanitarian 
and compassionate‖ are not found in the Board‘s reasons, although references are 
made on the other hand to ―the best interests of the child‖. But as the applicant has 
acknowledged, the ―best interests of the child‖ are relevant to the procedures 
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followed in such a case.
519
 
This statement confirms that the IRB has a duty to consider all humanitarian and 
compassionate grounds brought forth by a claimant, including the best interests of the 
child, upon making a decision on admission. 
In another case regarding the deportation of a Romani couple that has a Canadian-born 
child, the Court recognizes the inclusion of access to proper education in the analysis of 
the best interests of the child
520
. One of the main concerns of the parents in this case was 
the discrimination faced by Romani children within the Romanian education system, 
which results in the Romani community being limited in its ability to earn a livelihood. 
The Court establishes in this case, as well as in Patel, that the general well-being and 
necessities of life for the child have to be considered when evaluating the best interest of 
the child, and those may include civil and political rights as well as socio-economic 
rights. Hence, children‘s rights do not create new and separate mechanisms of protection. 
They expand existing ones beyond their literal interpretation, in accordance with new 
developments in human rights law. The next section focuses on whether women‘s rights 
have the same effect on asylum practices. 
6.3.Gender-Related Persecution and Concerns Specific to Women 
It is generally recognized that women and girls are a more vulnerable group as 
refugees
521
, and there is growing acceptance for the inclusion of women as a particular 
social group within the Convention Refugee definition
522
, and for feminism as a political 
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 for the purpose of the Refugee Convention definition. Edwards comments on 
the developments regarding refugee women in these terms: 
As a culmination of these developments, judicial reasoning took on new approaches, 
moving away from paradigms dominated by the experiences of male refugees, and 
towards a gender-sensitive and gender-inclusive interpretation and application of 
refugee law that gave equal significance to the sometimes different, although no less 
serious, forms of persecution feared by women. Case law has recognized a wide 
range of valid claims, including sexual violence, domestic violence, punishment and 
discrimination for transgression of social mores, sexual orientation, female genital 
mutilation, and trafficking […].
524
 
These comments reflect the focus of this section. It will combine gender-specific 
concerns in international human rights law, the most recent guidelines issued by the 
UNHCR, and how they impact on Canadian asylum legislation and case law. 
The ICCPR recognizes the right of women to enjoy all civil and political rights without 
discrimination
525
 and prevents the imposition of the death penalty on pregnant women
526
. 
The ICESCR reiterates the prohibition of discrimination against women
527
 and further 
protects them against discrimination in work conditions
528
. These provisions reflect an 
                                                 
523
 Alice Edwards, ―Displacement, Statelessness and Questions of Gender Equality under the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women‖, (August 2009) Legal and Protection 
Policy Research Series, PPLAS/2009/02 (UNHCR, Protection Policty and Legal Advice Section (PPLAS)) 
at 17 [Edwards, ―Gender Equality‖] 
524
 Ibid.at 52. 
525
 Article 3 ICCPR: ―The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the  
equal right of men and women tforth in the present Covenant.‖ 
526
 Article 6(5) ICCPR: ―Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below 
eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant women.‖ 
527
 Article 3 ICESCR: ―The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of 
men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the present 
Covenant.‖ 
528
 Article 7 ICESCR: ―The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work which ensure, in particular: 
(a) Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with: 
(i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular 
women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal 
 
 154 
awareness of common patterns of discrimination against women and have been expanded 
by the adoption of the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW)
529
 and its enforcing Committee‘s position that gender-based 
violence fits within the definition of discrimination against women
530
.  
However, if we apply this in the asylum context, not all discrimination against women 
amounts to persecution. It appears, rather, from Edwards‘ comments and examples of 
persecution, that it becomes persecution when tied with some form of violent or cruel 
behaviour that exploits the particular vulnerabilities of women. It may also become 
persecution when it results directly from a discriminatory state policy
531
.  
Also, Edwards contends, the CEDAW requires asylum states to implement gender-
sensitive asylum procedures by considering the foregoing types of gender-related 
persecution, as well as the way gender may affect the possibility of reaching an IFA
532
. 
She further calls attention to the various forms of discrimination, which prevent women 
from reaching a state of asylum and essentially stem from the human rights situation of 
the country of origin.  
These can include restrictions on the freedom of movement of women in her country 
of origin, lack of access to necessary documentation, such as passports, because she is 
female, legal requirements for permission from husbands to travel or cultural factors 
that put women travelling alone or without male family members at risk of 
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As such, they appear to fall out of the scope of the protection system in countries of 
asylum such as Canada, which process mostly inland claims. However, part of my 
enquiry on the role of UNHCR and independent organizations in international protection 
has shown that Canada protects some individuals abroad through its humanitarian-
protected persons abroad classes. 
The UNHCR has issued and updated guidelines on the integration of gender in the 
interpretation of the Refugee Convention
534
. The guidelines explore how gender, as a 
social construct, may affect persecution based on one of the five grounds enumerated in 
the Convention. For instance, it may intersect with religion, if a woman is persecuted for 
not conforming with the behavioural codes assigned to women in her religion
535
. They 
also touch upon the interpretation of social group as including sex, which is, like other 
social groups, innate and unchangeable
536
. 
Those guidelines have been picked up by the IRB, which issued its own guidelines for 
board members processing gender-based persecution claims. The IRB identifies four 
broad categories of women refugee claimants where gender may be relevant for 
understanding persecution. These are: 
 Women who fear persecution on the same Convention grounds, and in similar 
circumstances, as men, [women] who fear persecution solely for reasons pertaining to 
kinship, i.e. because of the status, activities or views of their spouses, parents, and 
siblings, or other family members, [women] who fear persecution resulting from 
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certain circumstances of severe discrimination on grounds of gender or acts of 
violence either by public authorities or at the hands of private citizens from whose 
actions the state is unwilling or unable to adequately protect the concerned persons, 
[and women] who fear persecution as the consequence of failing to conform to, or for 
transgressing, certain gender-discriminating religious or customary laws and practices 
in their country of origin.
537
 
The IRB goes on to condone the inclusion of gender in the category of particular social 
groups, based on the Ward
538
 case, as well as on the UNHCR‘s interpretations of 
international law
539
. In such cases, the persecution has to occur because of the person‘s 
gender, or because of a woman‘s belonging to a specific subgroup of women. 
Dauvergne‘s research on the vulnerabilities of women in all aspects and stages of the 
refugee determination process has shown that the IRB‘s gender guidelines have not been 
consistently and effectively applied
540
. In many recent cases, both the Board fails to 
appreciate the particular vulnerabilities of women and the trauma associated with sexual 
violence.  
For example, in the recent Gaymes case
541
, a woman from the small island state of St-
Vincent and Grenadines was claiming persecution based on the fact that her father had 
sexually abused her. Her claim was that the abuse led to the development of a mental 
                                                 
537
 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Guidelines Issued by the Chairperson Pursuant to Section 
65(4) of the Immigration Act: Guideline 4 - Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related 
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illness, that she suffered continuous harassment by local people who knew of her 
situation, and that she had been the victim of a sexual assault by two men and a 
policeman who took advantage of weaknesses caused by her mental illness. Both the 
Board and the reviewing Court deemed that she had not provided sufficient proof of the 
assault, disregarding the fact that it may be unrealistic to ask for documented proof in a 
case of rape, especially since the claimant was still not comfortable even mentioning it 
upon entry in Canada. In this case, the stigma attached to rape, as well as the other 
elements of persecution brought forth by the claimant, were not carefully weighed by the 
Court.  
In some cases, the IRB has recognized that women who face a personal risk of cruel 
treatment in the form sexual violence and who cannot obtain police protection should be 
granted protection
542
. There are, nonetheless, numerous instances where the Board does 
not properly assess psychological evidence related to sexual assault and the reluctance to 
report such incidents to the authorities in light of gender considerations 
543
. In many of 
those cases, the reviewing Court quashes the decisions based on insufficient 
consideration of the gender guidelines. In practice, however, only a minority of decisions 
are reviewed, which raises concerns as to the Boards consistency with the application of 
the guidelines.  
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Another critique is that men may also be persecuted based on gender if they refuse to 
conform to the gender identity that is assigned to them. LaViolette argues that the 
Canadian guidelines reflect persecution based on sex, rather than including all the forms 
of persecution based on gender as a social construct
544
. Even where women are 
concerned, LaViolette highlights cases before the IRB where claims by lesbian women 
were only considered in light of sexual orientation, without further analysis of the 
persecution related to their challenge to established norms of feminity
545
. These 
considerations reflect the need to carefully explore the ramifications of each individual 
case, while promoting an expansion of the interpretation of the notion of persecution and 
the social group nexus in light of different aspects of gender roles. The Federal Court has 
stated that the guidelines do not create new grounds for finding a person to be a victim of 
persecution
546
, but it is arguable that the concept of persecution itself is often being too 
narrowly interpreted. The Canadian interpretation based on gender thus seems to include 
women‘s rights in the application of sections 96 and 97 of IRPA, but not in a way that is 
as clear and consistent as the consideration of the best interests of the child within 
Canadian asylum practice. 
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Chapter 7. Conclusion  
This thesis has sought to provide a precise and nuanced view of Canada‘s compliance 
with complementary protection obligations imposed by international human rights law, 
while exploring different forms that complementary protection can take. It has argued 
that the granting of refugee status to a new category of persons who fear for their life 
within section 97 IRPA is a step forward, but does not represent Canada‘s full 
compliance with its international obligations. Through an analysis of state obligations 
based on several international human rights instruments developed after the 1951 
Refugee Convention, this thesis has shown that Canadian law usually honours the 
humanitarian concerns in international refugee law, while making efforts and creating 
loopholes in order to maintain its prerogative of exclusion based on national security. 
A historical overview of asylum practices and the creation of the international refugee 
protection regime has revealed a shift from state discretion to an aspiring universal and 
binding protection regime. The study of the work leading to the conclusion of the 
Refugee Convention  has revealed that it is inextricably linked with human rights law, 
and that it can be qualified as ―a specialist human rights treaty which acts as a lex 
specialis for persons in need of international protection‖
547
. Its drafting history shows that 
it was meant to provide a framework of protection that would operate on a case-by-case 
basis, and would be flexible enough to encompass most situations that were not 
foreseeable at the time. In McAdam‘s words: 
Whereas pre-1951 concepts of protection, based on national category, were expanded 
incrementally through their application to new national groups, the Convention 
conceptualization has been extended through developments in human rights law, 
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which have informed both the meaning of ‗persecution‘ and the scope of non-
refoulement. Accordingly, while human rights law widens threshold eligibility for 
protection, the Convention remains the blueprint for rights and legal status.
548
  
This thesis followed the foregoing reasoning by defining complementary international 
protection as a corpus of obligations which widen the scope of international refugee law 
with the objective of making it complete, that is encompassing all situations where 
individuals find themselves unprotected by their state of nationality or residence. In 
reality, this translates as non-specific human rights instruments being applied to the 
context of refugee protection. Presuming that states have a positive duty to prevent and 
sanction violations of human rights within their jurisdiction, an inability or unwillingness 
of the state to do so puts individuals in a situation where they may literally be called 
―persons in need of protection‖. 
My method involved investigating what recourses exist when a state is unable or 
unwilling to protect different types of rights. This served to highlight situations where a 
basis for protection was created outside of the Refugee Convention, situations where 
rights were used for the interpretation of the Convention itself, as well as situations where 
international organizations create initiatives to guarantee the fulfilment of human rights. 
The only source of protection which has sufficient independence from the Refugee 
Convention to be deemed a separate and complementary protection mechanism is the 
prohibition of non-refoulement in article 3 of CAT. Its embodiment in Canadian law, in 
section 97 of IRPA, does not mention either this article of the CAT or the principle of 
non-refoulement, thus avoiding the explicit integration of those peremptory norms. It 
expresses a clear integration of the prohibition of torture by including most elements of 





article 1 of CAT and expanding it to include cruel, inhuman or unusual treatment or 
punishment as well, in accordance with article 7 ICCPR. 
 Section 97 of IRPA links the category of persons in need of protection to the same 
exclusions that are contained in the refugee definition, in article 1(E) and (F) of the 
Refugee Convention, and leaves them subject to numerous grounds of inadmissibility at 
the frontier, all of which go against the absolute nature of the principle of non-
refoulement. An analysis of case law has shown consensus that non-refoulement is 
implicit within section 97 of IRPA, that it is indeed absolute, and that the CAT prevails 
over the Refugee Convention. However, courts have sought to justify the exclusions and 
the effective preference for the Refugee Convention over the CAT, instead of reassessing 
IRPA‘s validity in light of international law. 
With regards to civil and political rights that influence the interpretation of the refugee 
definition and the principle of non-refoulement, most can be integrated within the 
meaning of persecution in the Convention definition. However, Canadian law does not 
respect the provisions relating to territorial access in the ICCPR and the Refugee 
Convention, as its admissibility requirements allow for rejection of claimants at the 
frontier on the basis of health or criminality grounds, without proper weighing of the risk 
the claimant faces. If the risk is torture or cruel punishment, it goes against the principle 
of non-refoulement. This thesis has also shown that the unwillingness to provide health 
care may be accepted as grounds for protection, but the exclusion in cases of inability to 
provide health care, and the public health exclusion at the frontier also go against the 
absolute nature of non-refoulement. 
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In relation to other social and economic rights, Canadian law does not provide a clear 
framework of protection for situations where national disasters undermine individuals‘ 
ability to provide for their basic needs, unless a breakdown in infrastructure causes civil 
and political unrest. In such cases, Canada may consider individuals to be persons ―in a 
similar situation‖ to refugees and accept them through its humanitarian assistance 
program, based on recommendations by the UNHCR. Also, the Supreme Court has 
explicitly rejected natural disasters as persecution in the Ward case by essentially placing 
their victims on the same level as people who merely seek a higher standard of living. 
This thesis has also posed the question of longer-term concerns for the development of 
minority cultures and the ability to earn a livelihood through non-discrimination in 
education, which have been shown to hold little weight in protection claims. Despite 
limits to the humanitarian character of the Canadian asylum system, it has generally 
welcomed guidelines which take the interests of families, children and women into 
account. Overall, these aspects of the Canadian implementation of international law could 
be criticized for not being generous enough, but this thesis has also shown that responses 
to these rights are not yet fully developed within international law itself. 
This thesis generally aimed at exploring the general meaning of ―persons in need of 
protection‖ within international law, and has demonstrated that it encompasses victims of 
the breakdown of states‘ ability to protect their residents‘ and nationals‘ basic human 
rights. In Canadian legislation, the expression has come to identify a more limited group 
of persons. Although other measures provide some additional protection, they generally 
appear as a pale reflection of the evolution of Refugee law in light of the development in 
human rights law, in large part because they are hindered by numerous exclusions and 
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their overall complexity. Complementary protection is still a concept under development, 
but its emergence shows how wide-ranging and idealistic rights can become meaningful 
and enforceable in a specific area of law. Its Canadian implementation, though limited, 
adds to the growing international support for the existence of complementary protection 
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